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Abstract
Why does the Islamic State (IS) target and kill more civilians in Syria than Jabhat al-Nusra (JN),
another influential jihadist organization embedded in the Syrian Civil War that - like IS - once
identified as a formal al Qaeda (AQ) affiliate? Spanning from 2011 to 2018, IS has consistently
targeted and killed a significantly larger proportion of civilians in Syria compared to JN. This
study poses that the discrepancy in target behavior displayed by these jihadist groups with
similar origin stories, group size, and region of operation is effectively explained by a schism in
the jihadist ideological model that has divided Salafi militant organizations. While IS and JN
pursue a basic goal of transforming the regional political order into a jihadist vision of shariabased government, they disagree on what approach best promotes this goal in Syria. JN adheres
to the traditional AQ-promoted agenda of long-term pragmatism, which is focused on attracting
popular support from local Sunni Muslims by portraying JN as a nationalist insurgency fighting
the Assad regime. In contrast, IS broke from AQ in 2014 by enacting a short-term approach to
jihad, aimed at launching a hyper-violent offensive to capture a territorial Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria. By comparatively analyzing the English-language online magazines of each group,
this study seeks to distinguish the divergent worldviews of IS and JN, which has informed their
violent targeting of civilians in the Syrian conflict.
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INTRODUCTION
At the onset of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, millions of civilians were caught in constant
airstrikes perpetrated by the incumbent Assad regime forces. On the ground, non-combatants
were bombarded by retaliatory crossfire committed by radical Islamist groups and moderate
secular militias that at times collaborated to fulfill their shared objective to defeat the Assad
government. Amid this turmoil, in early 2014 another war was declared in Syria. The Salafi
jihadist Al Qaeda (AQ) affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) declared its opposition to a former AQ
offshoot, the Islamic State (IS), a Salafi jihadist organization that had deployed its forces beyond
the borders of the group’s original location in Iraq and began capturing territory in Syria.1
After declaring war on the Islamic State, JN primarily played a defensive role against the
group. However, infighting between the groups escalated over oil fields in the Deir ez-Zour
governate in eastern Syria during the summer of 2014.2 Ultimately, JN withdrew from the region
bordering Iraq, after footage from IS offensives showed mass executions of Iraqis who resisted
the territorial expansion of IS.3 In August of 2014, IS implemented it’s severe tactics against the
al-Sheitat tribe, a group that lives in the Deir ez-Zour governate, and belongs to the Sunni sect of
Islam that IS claims to represent. After some of the al-Sheitat men staged an insurrection in
retaliation for the IS execution of a fellow tribesman, IS punished the group by rounding up all
700 al-Sheitat men, and beheading, crucifying, and shooting each individual.4 In total, 100
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fighters and 600 civilians died in this mass killing, which was filmed by the group and posted on
IS media platforms.5
As IS launched its brutal offensive in Syria, allied anti-Assad militia groups including JN
maintained territorial strongholds in the northwest provinces of Latakia, Hama, Idlib, and
western Aleppo.6 In July of 2014, a recording was leaked of JN leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani
discussing a plan to implement sharia law in Syria under the jurisdiction of emirates, or Islamic
political provinces. Even an informal suggestion that JN would independently implement
religious law over regions in Syria sparked an outcry from moderate factions of the Syrian
opposition. These local militias had joined forces with JN because the group utilized its AQsponsored military capabilities against the Assad regime rather than citizens and prioritized the
coalition agenda to weaken the Syrian Army. Under the pressure of concerned allies, JN publicly
released a statement which clarified that the group never announced “an independent emirate, or
the meaning of a state, or anything close to that” and that an emirate could not be established
without the endorsement of “jihadi factions or the local leaders of the country, or the people of
influence and of course, with the scholars inside and outside the country.”7 It was later confirmed
by a source in JN’s inner circles that Jolani “focused on jihad for the sake of jihad,” and despite
the leaked soundbite, he ultimately believed that “no Islamic State or caliphate will ever endure
in the current international order.”8
Between July and August of 2014, IS and JN had publicly released content from their
respective media wings regarding their role in the Syrian Civil war. While IS portrayed the group
as a dominant enforcer of sharia law through the mass slaughter of the al-Sheitat tribe, JN used
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its platform to assert its stance that sharia law would not be unilaterally implemented by the
group against any civilians without multilateral consent from parties in the Syrian opposition
movement. Ultimately, the two groups openly demonstrated two opposing models of legitimate
Salafi jihadist behavior in the Syrian civil war- either as religiously endowed actors with the
authority to dominate civilians, or pragmatic operatives that can be trusted by the Sunni Syrian
community.
The previous pages have laid out an anecdotal description of how the two most influential
Salafi jihadist actors in the Syrian civil war have either enabled or constrained their violence
against civilians. This study will now turn to a more systematic investigation of IS and JN have
exhibited different rates of targeting non-combatants over time by using the Global Terrorism
Database (GTD). As indicated by the trendlines in Graph 1 and Graph 2, both groups reached the
highest incidence of attacking civilians between the years of 2015 and 2016. However, IS’s
amount of attacks during this time period were almost double that of JN. The highest total
attacks perpetrated by IS against civilians in a month-long time frame added to a sum of 95
incidents, while JN peaked at a total of approximately 53 incidents. Although these groups have
been rendered as “ostensibly similar” Sunni terrorist groups in the same conflict, why have they
evolved to conduct significantly different rates of civilian targeting over the course of the Syrian
civil war?9 This thesis will analyze English-language jihadist magazines to argue that a
divergence in organizational approaches to Salafi jihadist ideology has informed the trends of
civilian targeting reflected in the graphs generated through the GTD.

9

Chapman, Geoffrey. "Islamic State and Al-Nusra: Exploring determinants of chemical weapons usage
patterns." Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 6 (2017): 112.
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Graph 1
Rate of Attack Incidents in Syria by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (2011-2018)10
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Graph 2
Rate of Attack Incidents by Jabhat Al Nusra (2011-2018)11
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The GTD features a running list of 190,000 terrorist attacks from 1970 through 2018.12
All incidents on the GTD must apply to the following three stipulations: First, “the incident must
be intentional,” second, “the incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of
violence, including property violence, as well as violence against people,” and last, “perpetrators
of the incidents must be sub-national actors. The database does not include acts of state
terrorism.”13
Each graph was created on the “Advanced Search” feature of the GTD, which enables
researchers to create a dataset of attacks based on the criterion of time period, region, country,
perpetrator group, weapon type, attack type, target type, and rate of casualties. Both IS and JN
were selected as perpetrator groups, and the country category was narrowed to Syria. The
trendlines in each graph reflect the incidence of attacks perpetrated by IS and JN from the
beginning of the civil war in 2011 to the most recent year-long rates documented by the GTD in
2018. The weapon, attack, and casualty fields were selected for most inclusive range available.
The target types selected to reflect civilian attack rates include the journalists or the media,
private citizens and property, tourists, and non-governmental organizations. Military attacks are
included in the graph to contextualize the combatant versus non-combatant targeting practices of
each militant group. To be clear, the main dependent variable for the study is the proportion of
all attacks carried out by IS and JN against civilian targets according to the coding criteria.
Finally, the GTD enables researchers to widen and narrow their definitions of terrorism
by including or excluding three criterion: criterion I “establishes that the included incidents
“must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal”…criterion II requires

12
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that “each attack must have evidence of intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other
message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims”… criterion III stipulates
that “the action must be outside of legitimate warfare activities.”14 These criteria were used to
filter the incidents of this study to ensure that all incidents perpetrated by IS and JN were
undoubtedly terror attacks.
An appropriate introductory case study of IS and JN’s strategic ideological divergences
and degrees of violence against the general public is exemplified in the groups’ use or non-use of
chemical weapons. Chemical weapons are an especially politicized tool of coercion in the Syrian
civil war. The Assad regime has repeatedly used chemical weapons against non-combatant
civilians in Syria, despite international condemnation. In August of 2013, the UN Security
Council convened meetings to address chemical warfare attacks by the Syrian army on the city
of Damascus, that killed up to 1,000 people who were largely local non-combatants.15 Almost
five years later, the Human Rights Watch documented 85 incidents in which the Assad regime
used chemical warfare during the civil war, despite international pressure to cease deploying
such weapons.16
As the Syrian Army has taken measures of extreme force to maintain political power
during the duration of the war, jihadist opposition forces such as IS and JN appear at face value
to harbor similar theological justifications and practical capabilities to use chemical weapons as a
defensive strategy against pro-regime forces. Both groups have been the targets of Assad’s
chemical weapons deployment and have gained control over regime stores of chlorine and sarin.
However, both IS and JN have different organizational principles which inform the ultimate
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incentive -or lack thereof- for a militant group to capitalize on the latent public fear triggered by
weapons of mass destruction used by the government, and to signal collective intent to match the
Assad regime’s brutal tactics against the civilian population to obtain power. The principles that
divide IS and JN are directly related to their approach to gaining legitimacy in Syria and amongst
jihadist sympathizers across the globe. While IS adheres to tactics of extreme force to achieve an
Islamic State in the short term, JN adheres to the AQ ideology that an Islamic State should be
pursued through a gradual strategy of integrating into local communities, while cultivating public
support for Islamic governance.
IS declared the establishment of an Islamic State across Iraq and Syria in April of 2014,
and has leveraged violence against Shia, religious minorities, and Sunni tribes that are perceived
to not be strictly committed to the highly conservative IS brand of Islam. IS used “unending
hostility towards kufr (apostate regimes) and takfiri (excommunicated Muslims)” to legitimize its
authority to establish sharia law and monopolize force over the civilians in its territory.17 IS has
routinely used violence against the public as an essential tool to promote its interests and is not
operationally constrained by the status of local or international approval due to its brutal
approach to seizing territorial power. IS has integrated chemical weapons into its arsenal and has
routinely employed them: from 2014 to 2017, conflict monitoring groups have recorded 71
instances of IS chemical weapon use.18
On the other hand, no international bodies that oversee conflict zones have confirmed that
JN has used chemical warfare during the civil war, even as a method of defense against the
incumbent Assad regime.19 JN embraces AQ strategist Abu Mus’ab al Suri’s theory that Sunni
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jihadists can only establish an Islamic State in the long term, by first obtaining a base of popular
support from the Muslim community.20 As a result, JN’s on-the-ground presence in Syria has
starkly contrasted that of IS, as its leaders have attempted to avoid mass casualty violence against
civilians, and exhibited efforts to legitimize the organization as capable of allying with a variety
of Sunni opposition groups in the civil war. By achieving influence through alliances with local
insurgents and not violently enforcing authority over the region, JN aims to gradually integrate
itself into the opposition as a pragmatic alternative to the brutal rule of the Assad regime or IS.
Unlike IS, which views chemical weapons as a useful tool to incorporate into its ultraviolent
proto-state operations, JN conversely applies organizational sanctions on violence that could
harm scores of Sunni non-combatants that JN claims to defend. Thus, the contrary messaging of
these jihadist groups as either aggressive or pragmatic actors in the conflict acts to enable or
constrict their collective ability to use weapons of mass destruction in Syria. If JN embraced this
force, they would alienate the local allies that they claim to represent.
This dynamic between IS and JN’s divergent views on establishing an Islamic State,
defining a Muslim constituency, and determining the costs or benefits of frequent civilian
targeting is consistent beyond the topic of chemical warfare. Years before the initiation of the
Syrian civil war, two camps began to emerge in the Salafi jihadist landscape with distinct
ingroups, outgroups, prioritized objectives, and plans of action that has been most clearly
manifested in Syria. Currently these groups are at war, ideologically and practically, over the
role of Salafi jihadists in civil conflict. This schism reached its apex in Syria, and the escalation
of infighting created significant ripple effects beyond the Middle East, dividing like-minded
followers across the globe and informing their identification with jihad.

20

Ibid., 115.
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Justification of the Study
Syria has been recently described as “the center of the world for jihadist militancy.”21
When the nation broke out in civil war in 2011, there were a diverse range of secular nationalists
and Islamist-minded insurgent groups that sought to confront the Assad Regime. However, as the
conflict continued throughout the 2010’s, the field of opposition militias began to winnow.
Within several years, Salafi jihadist factions emerged as increasingly more influential, organized,
and superior actors fighting against Syrian incumbent forces.22 Of these actors, undoubtedly the
most infamous militant organization is IS (also known as The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham,
and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant), a group that operates in Iraq and Syria, and has
established the main base of its claimed territorial proto-state in the northern Syrian city of
Raqqa. Another less globally well-known Salafi-jihadist group is JN (which was renamed Jabhat
Fatah al-Sham in July of 2016, again renamed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in January of 2017), a group
that operates exclusively in Syria and has “arguably established an even more sustainable
presence in Syria than IS.”23 Both of these organizations have been designated by the US as
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO’s).
The US designated IS’s early predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq, as an FTO in late 2004, after
the group’s leader Abu Musab Zarqawi agreed to make a loose affiliation with AQ.24 AQ was
then led by Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on
the US World Trade Center. AQ leaders pursued this alliance based on the rationale that by

21
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partnering with Zarqawi’s group, they would be able to direct and assist in attacks on US troops
stationed in Iraq, who represented AQ’s top target in the Middle East.25 However, within months
of this affiliation, AQI escalated its rate of attacks on local civilians, churches, and Shias in Iraq,
to the dismay of AQ leaders, who expected that Zawahiri’s attacks would be explicitly conducted
against Western and US-led combatants in Iraq.26
JN was labeled as a terrorist organization by the US State Department in December of
2012, when it was confirmed that the group was a Syrian-based offshoot of IS. This designation
was confirmed months after JN had begun coalition building with other rebel factions in Syria.
Notably, in response to this categorization, a broad coalition of insurgent groups across the
nation released statements in protest, declaring “We are all Jabhat al-Nusra.”27 Even the
moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA), an opposition group that was provided arms assistance by the
US a year later claimed that members affiliated with JN comprised 7.5-9% of their group
membership.28
The vociferous backlash of Syrian opposition groups to the US classification of JN as an
FTO indicates how rapidly the organization led by Jolani horizontally consolidated support
amongst rebel factions in the region. This approach to achieving influence in the region was
starkly pragmatic and long-term compared to the rapid method of top-down dominance used by
the IS, that has been mainly characterized by enforcing rule over local rebel groups rather than
remaining open to power sharing schemes. IS operationalizes a black and white ideological lens
in which the ingroup is explicitly composed of those who have abdicated to the authority of the
proto-state, and the outgroup is literally any actor that does not pledge allegiance to the group. In
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contrast, JN firmly distinguishes itself from IS by promoting a grey-scale ideological lens, which
communicates a flexibility and openness to pursue a broad coalition of jihadist-inspired Sunni
constituents that do not seek an immediate Islamic caliphate, but rather prioritize the fall of the
Assad regime as the first essential step to restoring righteous Islamic rule to the region.
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1
LITERATURE REVIEW

Post-World War II Rates of Violence Against Civilians
Global patterns of oppositional dynamics and targeted violence have marked a change
in the landscape of conflict dynamics in recent decades. In the post-Cold War era, intrastate civil
wars have become far more common than interstate conflicts between nations, civilians have
increasingly become targets of armed groups in civil war, and the proportion of private civilian
casualties in conflict are increasing.29 This basic trend is described by Kaldor, who states: “At
the beginning of the twentieth century, 85–90 percent of casualties in war were military... By the
late 1990s, the proportions of a hundred years ago have been almost exactly reversed, so that
nowadays approximately 80 percent of all casualties in wars are civilian.”30 In an effort to
understand the increasing incidence and lethality of intrastate conflict in recent decades, most
political scholars in the mid to late 20th century focused on retrospectively examining the sociopolitical tensions that produce the outbreak of conflict, rather than determining the violent
targeting practices that occurred during periods of war.31 It is critical for the academic
community to examine how and why different parties in a conflict rationalize, sanction, or
restrain their combatant members’ use of violence against civilian targets during protracted
conflicts. This research will offer insights into how the nuanced frameworks of group rationale

29
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30
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31
S.N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006.
35.

17

regarding violent action are instrumental in directing the behavior of politically-motivated
terrorist groups.
The Assumed Irrationality of Violence Against Civilians
One of the puzzles of civilian targeting, and the reason why some scholars have attributed
these atrocities to irrational logic, is that the random killing of non-combatants is largely
counterproductive for an armed group in the conditions of civil war.32 If civilians are murdered
regardless of their willingness to cooperate with an armed militia, then local non-combatants will
have no incentive to swap their political leanings or increase their support of the antagonizing
group within the context of a civil war, in which two or more oppositional actors are involved.33
Kalyvas’ examines violence in civil war through the lens of a dual actor scenario, in which an
incumbent state army and an insurgent militia behave with a certain rationale based on this
classification. For example, he poses that an insurgent militia will typically lack intelligence
about the population compared to the government and is more likely to kill unselectively because
rebels do not have the information to separate friend from foe in certain contested regions.34
However, this dual system does not explain how two insurgent groups that contest the same
regime and operate in the same security environment differ in their rates of violence against
civilians.
The killing of civilians, especially by terrorist groups, is often labeled as
“indiscriminate,” implying that the lethal actions are entirely random and senseless.35 Armed
parties in a conflict, whether they be state or non-state actors, frequently label large cohorts of
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people as existential enemies that should be subjected to harm or elimination. Kalyvas classifies
indiscriminate violence as an incident when “individuals are targeted solely on the basis of their
membership in a group perceived to be connected with the opposition and irrespective of their
individual actions (groups may be based on ties of kinship, location, class, ethnicity, etc.).”36
Yet, Drake posits that when groups are targeted based on the status of their identity rather than
their actions, violence is not entirely random, because people are still consciously targeted by
violent groups as a designated outgroup deserving of violence.37 For example, during the
Algerian Rebellion of 1954, the National Liberation Front insurgency viewed all attacks against
Europeans as legitimate, because their ultimate aim was to repel all European colonial
enterprises from the region.38 Even if the criteria for a legitimate target is as broad as
“Europeans,” violence was not randomly perpetrated.39
Rational Violence Against Civilians
Valentino indicates that the more recent literature concerning violence against civilians in
the 21st century that was “once assumed to be a tragic, if virtually inevitable side effect of wars,
is now understood to play a central part in the deliberate strategies of belligerent groups.”40
Gagnon accordingly stated in 1994 that “The current major conflicts taking place along ethnic
lines throughout the world have as their main causes not ancient hatreds, but rather the
purposeful actions of political actors who actively create violent conflict.”41 Therefore, violence
does not occur randomly: atrocities involving civilians are not senseless nor are the killing of
noncombatants simply collateral consequences of greater warfare. Furthermore, in dictatorial
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regimes where political dissent is forcefully repressed, opposition groups are generally more
likely to resort to terrorist tactics to protest the government.42 Yet, when groups are both fighting
in the same conflict environment against authoritarian states, what explains their divergent
targeting tactics? Armed groups participate in conflict within a constrained set of conditions and
objectives that structure their rational behavior. Following this logic of actor rationality, political
violence scholars have highlighted economic, organizational and political factors as the dominant
structures that determine the varying patterns of insurgent violence.
Violence Against Civilians by Non-State Groups
Rebel groups embedded in intrastate conflict are more operationally constrained than the
governments they oppose. In the international political status quo, the state monopolizes the
military resources of the nation as a coercive mechanism to induce civilian compliance in
conflict. In contrast, insurgencies are operationally weak compared to the incumbent and often
rely on a “unique relationship” with civilians to survive.43 Valentino argues, “much more than
regular military forces in conventional wars, insurgent organizations must rely directly on local
civilian populations for supplies, intelligence, shelter, and recruits.”44 This strategy may be
particularly attractive when the insurgency draws on an especially large base of civilian
supporters. Because non-state groups tend to rely on on-the-ground local communities to
materially support their operations, these insurgents must consider if the violence that they
perpetrate against civilians will weaken their local approval and will thereby threaten the
survival of the group. In the case of the Real Irish Republican Army (IRA), their choice to plant
a bomb in Omagh, Northern Ireland in 1998 that killed twenty-nine people was ultimately
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detrimental to the group, because it triggered intense outrage amongst the local population and
caused the group to sink into political obscurity over the following years, as the Real IRA
conducting only three attacks between 2003 to 2008.45
Other authors view violence against private citizens as a limited strategy that can only
ever work as a short-term tactic in war. Killing civilians can be used as a mechanism of
intimidation to compel cooperation, but it can also strengthen resolve for populations to fight
against the repressive military force.46 Furthermore, violence aimed at the annihilation of noncombatants based on their ethnic group affiliation rather than their political behavior has also
been found to be ineffective “at least in the long run.”47 However, other scholars emphasize that
civilians will tolerate the presence of terrorist groups that are prone to indiscriminate violence
when their own government is not only politically repressing the population, but is concurrently
violating norms of human security by attacking the national populous.48 Callaway and HarrelsonStephens pose when the British government increasingly breached human rights norms against
Irish separatists in the 1970’s, local support for the non-state terrorist IRA significantly
increased.49 These findings indicate that when analyzing civilian support for terrorist activity,
researchers must take into account the temporal patterns of regime abuses against civilians that
produce incentives for the public to support or tolerate a sometimes volatile insurgency that
postures as a protector of the people. In fact, incidents of state brutality against civilians can
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constitute a means of advantageous comparison for a terrorist group, allowing the group to
justify violent actions as a means of “defending” its people against the aggression of the state.50
Explanations for Insurgent Violence Against Civilians
Recent literature on civil wars in the early 20th century have stated that violence
perpetrated against private citizens is part of a rational set of strategic choices that are uniquely
presented within the circumstances of warfare. One such argument holds that the dynamics of
territorial contestation that occur in war determine rates of violence against non-combatants.51 In
his groundbreaking 2006 study, “The Logic of Violence in Civil War,” Kalvyas posed that
violence against non-combatants is perpetrated through the dual strategies of selective violence,
in which non-combatants are attacked by the insurgency or the incumbency based on intelligence
about their collaboration with the enemy group, and indiscriminate violence, in which people are
assaulted solely based on their ethnic or racial identity.52 Kalyvas argues that the more restrained
use of selective violence against members of the opposition is more likely to occur in the
territorial zones controlled by one armed group, which enforces the singular authority to gather
accurate information about political dissention in the insurgent group’s region of domination.
Yet, in high conflict areas where combatant groups lack credible informative sources, noncombatant residents are more likely to be indiscriminately killed due to the lack of certainty that
military groups have about their connection to the enemy. Therefore, Kalyvas delineates a
landscape of conflict in which the extent of territorial control determines the restraint that
militias will demonstrate when using force against the public. The state-building campaign of IS
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resulted in increased brutality in IS-dominated areas, which serves to contradict this theory. This
thesis will expose how IS instrumentally framed “violence as hastening a new millennium,” to
justify unprecedented norms of violence in their jihadist community.53 While IS and JN use
similar radical Islamist frameworks to ground the legitimacy of their respective campaigns, their
ideological differences notably foreground the pathways of their different collective rationales
concerning violence.
To account for the variation in violence against combatant targets versus violence against
ordinary civilians, many authors examine the different organizational factors of a group that
detail the methods of communication -or lack thereof- between key leaders of a movement and
the many followers that fight for their cause. When there are disruptions in communication from
the authority figures at the top of the hierarchy to those on the front lines that do their bidding,
the principal-agent theory is evident. This logic posits that a limited group of “principal” elites
are highly committed to an organization and are actively formulating strategies to ensure longterm group viability, whereas lower-level “agent” members pursue short-term goals in combat
and are likely to exit the group and integrate back into society.54 Therefore, due to a lack of
commitment to group goals, a decentralized collective of low-level fighters in the group are less
intrinsically incentivized to consider long-term ideological interests of the group and practice
restraint with violence in conflict. This theory, however, does not discount the reality that
ideology is strategically operationalized by elites to garner a unique low-level profile of group
targeting. This paper will delineate the instrumental elements of IS and JN ideologies that
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critically distinguish the divergent agendas of Islamist social movements operating in the same
geographical arena of Syria.
By analyzing insurgent dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Potter
and Abrahms found that non-state groups are also susceptible to coordination-based principalagent deficiencies that leads to violent actions that are not sanctioned by elites. First, senior
leaders of the organization that are veterans of militant combat “have personally observed the
strategic fallout of indiscriminate bloodshed” resulting in a reluctance to use indiscriminate
violence as a strategic tactic, especially due to their leadership focus on the long-term goals of
the organization.55 This choice is exemplified by AQ founder Osama bin Laden, who promoted
the 9/ll attacks of American civilians abroad, yet admonished civilian targeting conducted by
low-level AQ affiliate soldiers in Muslim-majority countries.56 Second, lower-level members
lack the means to participate in militarized, calculated attacks, and are more likely to pursue
“soft” targets with little protection.57 Furthermore, the incentives of ingroup competition
amongst low-level fighters seeking hierarchical status within the organization make them willing
to prove their commitment to the organization through killing civilians when other means of
battlefield activity are limited to higher-level operatives.58 Therefore, when a militant group
lacks a strong communication network, or is dispersed across a wide region, subordinate
members often have limited strategic insight into the operational disadvantages of attacking
civilians.
Other principal-agent theories apply specifically to terrorism and are elevated to
examining how inter-group dynamics relate to the rates of violence against civilians. Abrahms,
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Ward, and Kennedy focused more specifically on the violent behaviors of prominent
longstanding “principal” organizations in comparison to the behaviors of their “agent” entities
that are later established as affiliates to the original group. The results of their study, which
evaluated key terrorist groups and their affiliates between 1998 to 2005, found that affiliate
groups are significantly more likely to commit violence against civilians compared to the parent
group.59 They account for this difference by noting that younger groups have a “liability of
newness” and are more likely to fail than well-established terror groups.60 Therefore, nascent
affiliate groups are found to be more likely to target civilians because killing non-combatants is
linked to increasing terrorist recruitment and prolonging group survival, rather than achieving
group goals. On the other hand, mature organizations are far more likely to exercise restraint
concerning violence against civilians, because killing non-combatants is proven to impede the
ultimate goals of the group that older organizations fixate on after ensuring basic security.61
Although the authors argue that parent and affiliate classifications are central to group propensity
to commit violence against civilians, their study does not compare the nuances in ideology or
rates of lethality between affiliate groups. However, they notably pose that “affiliates are indeed
even more indiscriminate when their network relationship to the parent is weaker.”62 Thus, this
study indicates the imperative to research the principal ideological continuities or discontinuities
between parent groups and their affiliates over time, and if changes in group relationships affect
patterns in violent targeting.
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Rather than emphasizing the organizational attributes of insurgencies as the root cause of
principal-agent dilemmas, other scholars argue that the economic assets of an armed group
correlate with the likelihood that low-ranking operatives in a militia will perpetrate random
violent behaviors unrelated to group goals. Jeremy Weinstein argues that the variation of
violence against civilians by armed actors is rooted in the “initial endowments” of armed groups
that present a principal-agent problem for some well-financed insurgents. Weinstein poses that
groups that are initially economically endowed will attract recruits that seek mainly pecuniary
benefits from their participation, and are less committed to self-sanctioning their violence
towards non-combatants out of concern that the force they use will impede the group
objectives.63 The economic argument suggests that socially endowed groups that attract
members dedicated to the ideological goals of the collective are more likely to be selective about
who they attack, and are more likely to discern if violence serves the strategic goals of the
group.64 However, Weinstein does not account for powerful ingroup dynamics of socialization
that occur upon entry and membership within the group, that may impact a member’s level of
investment in ideological goals.65 Furthermore, Stanton argues that there is little evidence since
1989 to prove the correlation between the availability of contraband to rebel groups and their
propensity to use violent, “destabilizing” tactics against civilians.66
Some authors argue that armed groups rationally choose to use violence against civilians
as a means to achieving a desired political end for the collective. The scholarly resolve that
violence against civilians is an instrumental tool for non-state groups is an underpinning notion
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of terrorism studies, that were advanced by the work of Crenshaw in the second half of the
twentieth century. Writing in 1990, Crenshaw defined terrorist violence as a “expression of
political strategy... a willful choice made by an organization for political and strategic reasons,
rather than the unintended outcome of psychological or social factors.”67 While not all civilian
targeting is classified as terrorism, the strategic approach of non-state actors to gain political
concessions through violence against non-combatant targets is commonly categorized as terrorist
violence.68 Furthermore, terrorism is also designed to render a significant psychological impact
by inducing fear in an audience that witnesses an attack but is not the direct physical target.69
Walter and Kydd provide one of the most referenced categorizations of strategic terrorist
tactics, that are intended to coerce a specific policy concession from a political regime. Strategic
theorists traditionally define five desired outcomes vis-a-vis the state that terrorists seek by
attacking civilians: attrition, to reduce the state’s will to fight; provocation, to trigger an
excessively brutal government reaction; intimidation, by instilling fear in the population;
spoiling, to disrupt peace processes deemed unfavorable for terrorist goals; and outbidding, to
convince publics that the terrorist group is an authentic threat to the status quo regime.70 This
perspective implies that terrorist groups are “preference-based,” meaning they choose to use
violence against civilians when targeting populations is considered as the optimal form of
resistance to achieve policy goals. Strategic terrorist scholars seek to explain terrorist behavior
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by adopting these tactics as explanatory factors regarding the occurrence of terrorism.71 Rather
than fully discounting strategic goals that foreground terrorist decision-making, this paper
approaches violence against civilians from a broader lens, seeking to locate the collective belief
systems that sanction purposeful acts of political violence.
Other authors argue that the strategy of outbidding, which involves demonstrating a
“groups capabilities, commitment, and intentions relative to other groups” in order to compete in
the same social movement.72 Hamming argues that the escalating competition of Salafi-jihadist
groups AQ and IS, two groups that hold influence in the Middle Eastern arena of conflict and
compete for like-minded jihadist fighters, have altered each group’s “strategic decision of which
enemies to attack.”73 Hamming states that shifts in targeting patterns are predominantly
perpetrated by the clash between AQ and IS, a tension evident by the fact that “since 2014,
almost not a single magazine, statement or speech has been published by AQ or IS without
mentioning the other, explicitly or implicitly condemning the other.”74
Hamming poses that similar social movements, such as AQ and IS that fall under the
Salafi-jihadist sect of insurgent groups mutually arrange their “enemy hierarchy” to challenge the
rising success of other Salafi-jihadist groups that compete with them for potential recruits.75
Hamming suggests that in the past IS has hybridized its message to encourage attacks on “near
enemy” targets in the Middle East and “far enemy” targets in the West. In contrast, AQ has
“adopted a new strategy to win the hearts and minds of Muslims” by distancing itself from
excessive attacks in the Middle East, while maintaining its posture as a long-standing advocate
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for prioritizing attacks against the West.76 Hamming views these rhetorical shifts in group
priorities as not constituent of the evolution of group ideology, but solely reducible to the process
of group outbidding. However, this paper will consider how group ideology is not simply
superficially generated by initial competition between organizations, but rather is imbued with a
deeper group investment in beliefs regarding the correct means to achieving an Islamic social
and political order in the Middle East.
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2
THEORY
The formulaic assumption of many of the preceding scholars is that “whatever
differences in rhetoric, groups and their members respond similarly to such incentives and thus
ideological differences are irrelevant.”77 Yet, particularly in the case of terrorist violence by nonstate actors that explicitly aim to achieve a political goal, the ideological orientation of the
political movement critically shapes the reasoning, justification, and perpetration of violence.
While some scholars focus on the varying territorial, economic, and strategic mechanisms that
limit and structure the actions of insurgent organizations, others investigate how ideas either
incentivize or restrict the violent behaviors of goal-oriented militant organizations. This thesis
adopts the latter approach, by comparing the English language publications of two Salafi jihadist
groups embedded in the Syrian civil war, to determine if the unique ideological profiles of
militant organizations influence their targeting behaviors.
Sanin and Wood define ideology as a set of ideas that comprise the identity of an armed
group based on four distinctive components of their mission.78 Ideology delineates the ingroup,
underlines grievances that the organization wishes to address, identifies the desired outcome of
the movement, and finally states a program of action that varies in clarity between groups.79 This
structure presents a dual instrumental and normative framework for non-state militant groups that
delimit the extent to which they use violence against varying military or non-combatant targets to
achieve a collective goal.
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Ideology is instrumental to the survival of insurgent groups because it addresses the “five
stylized facts” of non-state actors’ circumstances in a civil war. These facts summarize the
collective action problems of groups that oppose the political status-quo. Non-state groups are
categorically alienated from coordinated state military institutions and lack the communication
infrastructure commanded by the regime armies, often forcing them to rely on assistance from
local civilians. In addition, specifically clandestine terrorist organizations experience
communication deficiencies due to their covert tactics, attract operatives with a diverse range of
incentives to fight. In the purely instrumental sense, an insurgent group with a rational
operational strategy would develop a “weak program” of ideology that is tailored to address
these challenges. 80 Ideology is thus meticulously crafted by elite members to increase the
ideational cohesion vertically, across organizational hierarchies and laterally, across
geographically distant affiliates.81 By enhancing group coordination around explicit grievances,
goals, and actions of redress, leaders can avoid ingroup friction in decision-making and can
operate more efficiently under a united goal.
Sanin and Wood further that ideology influences group behavior not only because it
generates cohesion, but because it functions to instill normative structures in the group that later
influence that group’s path dependency.82 They pose “ideology implies particular skills, routines,
institutions, and rules of thumb,” such as the restrictions that Marxist insurgent groups place on
the sexual activities of their operatives, that influence members and non-members alike.83 The
rules delineated by ideology also structure the repertoire of violence that groups use. For
example, while the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) often practiced tactics of
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indiscriminate violence against civilians, LTTE militants rarely committed sexual assault against
non-combatant victims, which is typically common in atrocities that occur during sectarian wars.
Furthermore, the group regulated marriages of their members through ideological reasonings
which suggests that the group followed a strict ideological code that served to regulate the sexual
behavior of their members.84
However, in regard to categorizing ideology, most terrorism scholars resort to very broad
classifications that do not expose the ideological nuances between groups within the same
category that can incentivize or restrain violence against civilians. Piazza poses that active
terrorist groups in Iraq between 1968 and 2005 have been viewed by the international and
academic community as components of religiously-oriented, particularly violent, “Islamist”
wave of terrorism. However, the goal structure of these groups vary greatly and result in widely
varying levels of lethality against “soft” civilian targets.85 Three notably different terrorist sects
were operating in Iraq during this time period: Sunni militant groups affiliated with AQ, non-AQ
Sunni militias, and Shi’ite armed groups.86 While the latter two groups had specifically stateoriented goals of replacing the Iraqi government, AQ affiliates were oriented around more
transformative goals of embarking on a violent global resistance against all ethnic populations
and state regimes that varyingly contrasted their concept of Islamic ideological purity.87 Due to
their wide range of targets and radical agenda of ethnic cleansing, groups affiliated with AQ
were responsible for four times the amount of Islamist terrorist attacks in Iraq than non-affiliate
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groups that followed more pragmatic anti-regime agendas that were designed to attack the
military assets of the Iraqi state.88 The transformative or state-oriented goals of religious terrorist
groups that significantly correlate with their lethality provides an incentive to investigate how the
progressive diversification of Salafi jihadist ideology interacted with the state upheavals of the
Arab Spring.
Political scholars have posed that intensity and orientation of group ideology increases
the likelihood that groups will perpetrate violence against civilians. Through researching the
micro-foundations of insurgencies that include guerilla and terrorist organizations, Gates
concludes “even for the most blatant loot-seeking groups, ethnicity and ideology...play a role in
the pattern of compliance and enforcement for the rebel army.”89 Furthermore, he argues that if a
group has a “homogenous” ideology that is perceived to be contrary from societal norms, the
structure of group rewards will extend beyond pecuniary benefits to more immaterial returns of
ingroup approval.90 The motives of low-level action in ethno-nationalist and/or religious
movements become reliant on individual interpretations of the reasonings evil and good
espoused by the ideology, rather than the long-term strategy of the group. 91In addition, members
of organizations with ideological homogeneity seek rewards not limited to the explicit monetary
funds doled out by organizational leaders, but rather the immaterial achievement of social
glorification within the group.92 When the benefit structure of a group is motivated by subjective,
non-pecuniary rewards rather than an objective means to a materialistic goal, the rationale of
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fighters to kill or maim will likely be less controlled than a group that is not motivated by a
radical ideology.
Ideology functions according to three principles that make it a tool of socialization that is
rhetorically and operationally impactful for a political movement. Ideology is realized at a group
level, is historically-rooted, and is manifested in tangible organizational structures. Therefore, it
is actualized by a collective rather than a single group leader, is related to culturally revered
narratives of the past rather than entirely new interpretations of the world and is implemented in
institutional norms rather than merely abstract concepts.
While group leaders and propaganda creators are the main delegates that transmit
ideology, the concepts they promote evolve into a creed that becomes a centrifugal force of
group identity. Althusser more explicitly describes ideology as an “apparatus” that systemically
represents an “imagined” perspective of the world for group members.93 He argues that ideology
does not reflect to people the “real condition of their existence,” but is rather the “imaginary
relation” that people have to the “real relations in which they live.” Within a group setting,
personal belief systems are externally validated by like-minded group members, serving to
reinforce conviction in the worldview.94 An organizational creed enables an individual to
identify with an external collective, and to meaningfully strengthen membership within the group
through active commitment to the ideology.
Group leaders also link ideology to a glorified historical era or community that serves as
a model for a desired social order that the group seeks to achieve, a reference point for group
action, and for violent groups, a source of justification for forceful conduct. This reality evolves
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in a pattern of path dependency, as ideology is cultivated based on the precedent of a legitimated
structure and preserves institutional credibility by continuing to reproduce within historically
established boundaries. An example of ideological path dependency is the rational decision that
many groups make to motivate combatants through a historically relevant ideology. For example,
jihadist fighters reference passages in sacred Islamic texts such as the Qur’an and the Hadith
about violent Muslim armies who defended their faith against an external enemy. By alluding to
the righteous symbols of Islamic defense that are preserved in a faith-based history, these groups
justify their violence as a modern iteration of spiritually noble defense. When a historicallyderived narrative resonates with recruits and attracts public support, an organization is
incentivized to adhere to a creed that models a glorified era.
While ideology does not portray “reality,” it is manifested in actions that structure the
real world. Althusser states that all people are “endowed” with ideas, but ideas are physically
fulfilled by the reality that all conscious subjects “act according to their ideas,” which are
implemented into material practice.95 Ideology informs action-based communal customs that
comprise the structural elements of the group organization and mobilization. The LTTE’s
organizational ban on sexual assault, the degrees to which Islamist groups enforce sharia law,
and martyrdom rituals that celebrate attacks committed by self-sacrificing group operatives are
prime examples of how the ethical orientations of organizations shape group activities.
Scholars who study the mobilization of violent groups have often peripheralized ideology
as having a secondary role in the cause of violence. For example, Weinstein argues that group
economic endowments- or lack thereof- serve to attract recruits with varying levels of investment
in group goals. Well-endowed groups attract opportunistic recruits who seek predominantly
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pecuniary rewards and will “damage civilians” without considering ideological consequences.96
However, groups with few resources generally attract members that are motivated by group
objectives rather than financial gains. A strong group commitment to organizational ideals will
encourage militia members to use violence selectively to achieve their ends.97 Thus, Weinstein
contends that group financing is the key independent variable that ultimately determines the
extent of the organization’s ideological motives and operational calculations informed by
collective beliefs.
Unlike Weinstein, other scholars choose to entirely reject ideology as a factor in the
causative chain of violence. Prominent mid-twentieth century scholar of philosophy, Hannah
Arendt, has famously disassociated ideology as a central motive behind the choice to commit
atrocities against ordinary people in her “Banality of Evil” thesis. After witnessing the trial of
Adolf Eichmann, one of the leading Nazi coordinators of the Holocaust, Arendt resolved that
Eichmann was driven to oversee the killing of millions of civilians because of his desire to
advance his career in the Nazi Party. Arendt observed that Eichmann did not exhibit abnormal
psychological tendencies that could explain his investment in the implementation of the “Final
Solution.” Instead, she argued that the commander simply exhibited the basic human need to
perform his job, which dulled his sensitivity to the atrocities he was perpetrating.98 She stated,
Eichmann “had no motives at all. He ...never realized what he was doing.”99 Arendt implied that
Eichmann was not primarily motivated to kill ordinary people by the masses due to his conscious
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beliefs. She neglected the ideological socialization of the Nazi Party as any explanatory variable
of Eichmann’s deliberate construction of death camps for civilians across Nazi-held territory.
The entrenchment of ideology in the framework of politically-minded organizations has
been questioned in academia. Collier and Hofeller discuss modern ideology as merely a surfacelevel “window wash” that is operationalized by political elites to capture support from a targeted
domestic or international audience.100 Moreover, Collier sought to minimize the political
repercussions of ideological rhetoric by leaders of armed groups by using the “chocolate eater
metaphor.”101 The metaphor contends that if a person claims they are not a chocolate eater, yet
continues to indulge in chocolate, their behavior becomes fact, and objectively renders their
rhetorical testament to be false.102 This scenario can be equated to a plausible incident in a civil
war, when elite rhetoric does not align with group action. For example, a militia representative
could release a statement alleging his group did not execute an attack that killed civilians, even
when there is a plethora of evidence against this claim. Therefore, many critics of ideological
causation resolve that the “hard” facts of action override “soft” ideas as key explanatory factors
for violence in a conflict environment.103
However, Sanin and Wood question this theory by stating that the chocolate eater
metaphor has not reached its logical completion. They state, “if as a result of advertising a person
comes not only to value that image highly, then this will affect his chocolate eating practices.”104
This conclusive element is central to William Sewell’s perspective that ideology, like all social
structures, is “dual” in character, meaning that although ideologies are subject to “human
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volition” largely implemented by elite preferences, “ideological action is shaped by preexisting
ideological (and other) realities” of social construction.105 By rendering ideology as a
subcategory of social structures, Sewell contends that ideology is conditionally based on the
constraints and enablers of pre-established social institutions.106
Ideology is an instrumental tool that is used to an extent by most non-violent and violent
political movements to mobilize a group united by a collective interest. However, the
establishment of intensive ingroup socialization is especially pertinent to groups that use
violence as a strategy to achieve their objectives. Forty years of social psychology research has
established that most humans are exposed to social sanctions against violence during
developmental years of childhood which solidifies an aversion to violence for the average person
with no notable psychological abnormalities.107 These findings apply to members of terrorist
groups, as studies have consistently proven that terrorists have psychological profiles comparable
to those of the general public. Even the large majority of people who harbor radical ideas or
beliefs do not resort to violence to further their political preferences.108 Therefore, powerful
social forces and bonds are required to disengage moral conditioning during human childhood
development that discourages violence.109
Bandura states that violence against innocent civilians is categorically more challenging
for insurgent perpetrators to justify than violence against those who are directly employed by the
state in a military, administrative, or governance capacity.110 The latter targeting strategy has
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been traditionally employed by scores of insurgent militias spanning countless geographies and
time periods. For example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army paramilitary group against
British officials and forces at the beginning of the Troubles in 1970. One PIRA member stated,
“We regard all people who support the armed forces of the British Government in any way as
legitimate targets.”111 The Irish separatists thus categorized any individual who was perceived as
a collaborator with the “British war machine” as an enemy that was worthy of attack.112 Yet, the
killing of unarmed combatants cannot be easily rationalized as a defensive tactic, due to a
general lack of evidence of a victim’s affiliation with enemy operations.
The common unjustifiable status of violence against civilians rather than state-affiliated
targets motivates the question, how can people come to celebrate acts of inhumanity against noncombatants?113 Militant groups face the challenge of deciding when to use violence, which can
function to deter the threat of people supporting the opposition, or can backfire on the
perpetrators by alienating potential supporters.114 According to Drake, ideology provides four
instrumental and normative principles that define “motive and framework for action” for groups
that employ organized violence.115 These four critical steps include identifying an ingroup
constituency, delineating a set of grievances-which include the labelling of an outgroup,
prioritizing objectives that the group intends to pursue, and determining a program of action.
When the glorification of a “good” ingroup is starkly contrasted with the demonization of an
“evil” outgroup, the strategic use of violence becomes collectively rationalized.
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First, ideology delineates an ingroup that is worthy of preserving, which informs the selfidentification of members. Isolated, cult-like groups, such as commonly insulated terrorist
groups, are perceived as organizations that deliberately operationalize a creed designed to nullify
a member’s sense of individual identity and personal agency. However, Reicher makes an
opposing argument: that the social psychology of group identity facilitates a re-constituted “selfrealization” in the context of group membership.116 One of the common conditions of non-state
group membership makes ideology particularly pertinent to an independent armed group. Sanin
and Wood argue that “supporters (of a non-state group) are generally a heterogenous group,” that
hail from a range of socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds.117 Unlike national armies, non-state
groups do not uniformly conscript from a specific cohort of the population, and their members
have a greater diversity of social experiences118 Ideology therefore operates as a cohesive tool for
a group that seeks to expeditiously build a sense of community that increases individual
commitment to the collective.
A set of ideologically-inspired narratives, practices, and conduct are used to assimilate
members, which progressively lead to self-categorization within the ingroup. Ideological
immersion is notably more potent amongst terrorist groups that traditionally operate as
clandestine actors in isolated camps in order to survive against a state incumbent that exercises a
disproportionate amount of control over the security and intelligence environment. Chaliand and
Blin characterize these conditions as that of a sect, a group they describe as a “miniature worldintroverted, paranoid, and potentially suicidal.”119 In this scenario, members who only have
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access to ingroup interaction will be further entrenched in the singular worldview of ingroup
means and ends. Through the conditioning of a collective worldview, the social sanctions of
killing can be progressively dismantled from personal rationales during assimilation.
The second function of ideology is the presentation of challenges that a group wishes to
confront.120 All effective political movements that are fixated on topics as diverse as climate
change, disenfranchisement, or unionization commonly exhibit non-violent dissent towards a
cohort of people, if not complete passiveness to those who are not group members. However,
groups that pursue violence present challenges to group goals with an entrenched dimension of
animosity towards a sector of the population. In other words, their challenges are defined as a set
of “grievances.” An intense fixation on grievance in the group narrative leads to ideological
framing that mobilizes outgroup hate.121 Organizations that challenge the political status quo
view people they perceive to be associated to a greater or lesser extent with the opposition to be
the root cause of their unfavorable circumstances. This labeling is all based on ingroup
perception, rather than a measure of a targeted individual’s complicity with the sociopolitical
order. In the circumstances of mass violence against civilians, outgroups are subjected to
violence based on their group membership, rather than their complicity in the political order.
This principle was evident in the Holocaust, when “Jews, gypsies and homosexuals were killed
by the Nazis simply because they were Jews or gypsies or homosexuals.”122
Grievances attribute blame on others for the political circumstances of the ingroup. Not
all political movements malign an outgroup, which leads Reicher to resolve that the ideological
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characterization of an outgroup as an existential threat is what ultimately mobilizes violent
strategies.123 Ideology exploits a basic narrative of outgroup threat, that serves to justify the
violent attacks perpetrated by the ingroup. For example, hardline leaders of the Hutu Power
movement in Rwanda during the 1990’s justified mass violence against Tutsi civilians through
the ideological argument that a united Hutu nation could not be achieved if Tutsis existed in
Rwandan society.124
Third, ideology identifies the desired outcome of the movement, which is often informed
by an inspirational historical narrative that groups aspire to fulfill. Bandura argues that “people
do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to themselves the
morality of their actions.”125 Some terrorist groups that perpetrate violence against civilians
collectively aim to entirely upend the current social order and intend to restore the world to a
state of “purity,” in which an entire cohort of “unbelievers,” has been successfully eliminated.
The delineation of an “ends” can empower the “means” of violent collective action for a group
that envisions a better world without the outgroup. Therefore, as the pursuit of an exclusive
social order is reinforced, violence is framed as a legitimate method to exterminate a population
in the quest for a righteous goal.
The prioritization of group objectives is an essential aspect of ideology that can lead to
the general categorizations of violent groups under the same motive, and thus fail to predict the
different strategies that “ideologically similar” groups will pursue. For example, Drake describes
the activities of the Red Brigades of Italy and the Red Army Faction of West Germany, two
terrorist groups that were generally categorized as “communist” militias because they both
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sought to overthrow the capitalist governments of Western Europe in the 1970’s and 1980’s.126
While the Italian Red Brigades prioritized the overthrow of the Italian government, the West
German Red Army Faction had a more anarchistic worldview, and prioritized the demise of the
entire imperialist world order.127 As a result, the Red Army Faction attacked high-profile targets,
such as American journalists, that would garner them more exposure on the world stage that they
sought to influence.128 In contrast, the Red Brigades deliberately killed Italian police officers and
government agents as a symbolic means to convey their dissent to the capitalist state.129
Last, ideology prescribes a program of action that varies in clarity between groups.130 As
a collective agenda is concretized, the hierarchy of desired targets is also defined as a crucial
pathway to efficiently achieving group goals. This program of action both incorporates the
decision to use violence, and conversely the decision to restrict the use of violence to achieve
group goals.131 In relation to the respective groups of this study, ingroup and outgroup labeling
informs targeting priorities and plans of action. Furthermore, as violent means become
interpolated into group tactics, and killing of specific groups is collectively rewarded, a cyclical
dynamic takes place. Reicher states that “killing not only becomes acceptable (or ‘natural’) when
it can be celebrated as the right thing to do.”132 As killing of the outgroup becomes increasingly
valued within a collective plan of action, moral disengagement not only neutralizes a member’s
psychosocial feedback to violence, but also promotes brutality as a positive action that enhances
an actor’s belonging in the ingroup.
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The following theory captures how four essential structures of ideology can be cast in a
narrative framing that incentivizes violence over restraint. This method of socialization is
especially instrumental for terrorist groups that incorporate civilian targeting in their operations.
As previously mentioned, the killing of non-combatants involves a more intense violation of
social sanctions against killing ordinary people, who are not actively complicit with the political
order. Ideological narratives that repetitively dehumanize a whole cohort of combatants based on
their political, racial or religious identity enable violent actors to easily defile masses according
to general social categorizations, which is far easier than obtaining concrete evidence of a
specific victim’s opposition to the group.133
Ideology shapes how members cohere to a group and morally disengage from
perpetrating violent acts. In addition, ideology is not a static phenomenon, and an organization’s
changing commitment or departure from a certain belief system can be a critical mechanism that
shapes the fluctuating patterns of Sunni jihadist violence in conflict.134 This thesis will highlight
how insurgent organizations emphasize or de-emphasize certain themes in the realm of Salafi
jihadist thought over time to adapt to the complex conflict environment in the Syrian civil war.
The Ideas Salafi Jihadist Groups Share
Salafism is an interpretation of Islam that was first instituted as a distinguished school of
Islamic thought and daily practice in the 14th century by Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya.135 This
ultraconservative sect of Sunni Islam holds that “the Qur’an and the Sunna (the Traditions of the
Prophet) are the only legitimate sources of law, they aspire to demonstrate the tenets of the first
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generations of Muslims in their daily conduct, they aim to rid Muslim societies of any nonIslamic influences, and deem it obligatory to defend this way of life from the intrusions of other
religious, political, or military forces.”136 Salafism emerged as a militaristic socio-political
movement in the 18th century that began its most contemporary iteration in the late 1980’s jihad
resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Foundational leaders of AQ such as Osama
bin Laden met and formed a coherent Islamist militant agenda against Western “invaders” which
included hegemonic non-Muslim regions such as the Soviet Union, North America, and Europe.
All Salafi jihadist groups share the ideological objective of establishing an Islamic
political order.137 Also known as a “Caliphate,” this governing body is referred to as a “state,”
which is a territorial dominion ruled by a Muslim authority figure that is traditionally known as a
caliph.138 Organizations in this faction follow the radical Islamist conviction that sharia law is
the only legitimate justice system and should guide the identity of government.139 There is a
deeper ideological notion that an Ummah, or a utopian community of faithful Muslims will live
within the boundaries of the Caliphate, adhere to sharia law, and emulate the lifestyle of the
Prophet Muhammad, in fulfillment of Allah’s wishes.140 Despite this consensus on an ultimate
goal of Salafi jihadists, the following study will decisively demonstrate how Salafi jihadist
groups divide over the legitimacy of establishing an Islamic community in the near future, or
later, once a broader coalition of Muslims have given support to the rule of a caliph.
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The resurgence of Salafi-jihadism in the modern era represents an overarching movement
of religious imaginaries in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, that resist the
influence of European neocolonial practices, democracy, and globalism in predominantly
Muslim countries.141 In recent decades, Western ideals have transformed the political status quo
in the MENA to increasingly secular modernist norms that have “reduced the role of Islam in its
textual, judicial and liturgical forms, in the everyday life of the regions’ communities.”142 This
political reformation in the MENA has often led to tyrannical governance, repression of the
public, and bloody sectarian divides over the uncertain future of power brokerage in the region.
The most radical Islamic sects in the region believe that restoring the Middle East to its former
geopolitical prowess requires a complete reversion to the glorified days of the first three
generations of Muslims. For Salafi jihadists the only religiously legitimate means to re-claiming
Islamic political dominance in the region is through jihad.
Jihad is a faith-based concept that promotes “divinely sanctioned warfare with the
objective of either expanding Islam or defending it.”143 In Arabic, the word is most literally
translated into “striving” or exerting oneself, on the faith-based imperative of the Qur’an.144
Jihad is split into two imperatives: offensive jihad (fard kif-faya), which is the collective
obligation of Muslims to fight upon the request of an Islamic sovereign; defensive jihad (fardayn) is the individual duty of all able-bodied Muslims to defend all threatened Muslim
communities, even in the absence of authoritative orders of Islamic public officials.145 The vast
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majority of the global Muslim community considers jihad to be interpreted as an exclusively
spiritual, non-violent endeavor. Even the minority of Muslims who interpret defensive jihad as a
call to arms believe that a there is a significant support amongst the worldwide Muslim
community to militarily protect the faith from an actor that is broadly acknowledged as a direct
threat to the religion.146 Salafi jihadists represent a small radical sect of Sunni Muslim thought,
which holds that Western political, economic, and military intrusions on predominantly Muslim
countries in the MENA have warranted an imperative for every Muslim to take up arms against
those they perceive to threaten the institution of fundamentalist Islamic states.147 Furthermore,
Salafi jihadists share common grievances towards regime leaders who are self-identifying
Muslims, yet are perceived to employ secular governance structures that do not adhere to the
laws instituted by the Prophet Muhammad at the dawn of Islam.
The argument that was the catalyst for modern jihad was a written by Abdullah Azzam,
who promoted jihad as a legitimate defense of Muslim lands in Afghanistan against invading
Soviet Forces, and argued that jihad was as obligatory as the main pillars of Islam in the modern
era.148 Up to 20,000 fighters motivated by Azzam’s declaration flocked to Afghanistan and
organized militant training camps in the region, many of which joined the ranks of AQ and its
affiliates.149 Azzam’s contemporary use of the Islamic precedent of jihad to galvanize fighters in
a pan-Islamic movement, is a precedent-setting example of how concepts derived from Islamic
scripture are rhetorically manipulated by jihadist leaders to sanction violence.150
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What Divides Salafi Jihadist Groups
All Salafi jihadist groups refer to an ideational program based on ultra-conservative
interpretations of Islamic scripture. These Islamist groups also believe that violent tactics are
theologically legitimate based on their shared aspirations to establish an Islamic political order.
Despite these similarities, the spectrum of stances within this ideological category “lead to
differences in the targeting patterns of terrorist groups- even between groups which have
superficially similar but distinct ideologies.”151 Therefore, Salafi jihadists behave differently
depending on the stances they have regarding the controversies in their belief system.
One of the central debates between Salafi jihadist groups, at times triggering group
infighting, factional splits, and even the declaration of war of one group upon another, is their
philosophies on how to justifiably achieve the establishment of an Islamic state. All Salafijihadist organizations lie at the extreme end of the spectrum of Islamic theology. Those that are
regarded as the ‘moderate’ actors in this faction adhere to the Qur’an, which explicitly states that
the caliphate can only be pragmatically established with the consensus and unity of the
transnational Muslim community. More radical sects like IS believe that it is the imperative of
jihad to establish a territorial Islamic State that represents and collectivizes the Ummah as soon
as possible. Their method does not prioritize the condition of widespread Muslim agreement and
voluntary engagement with the territorial caliphate.152 The subset of jihadist groups that quickly
declare territorial establishment of an Islamic State also fixate on the apocalyptic concept of the
“end of times” that expands the fanatic imagination of the organization.153 These modern-day
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stances date back to centuries-long sectarian divisions within Islam, that are distinctively
invoked by IS and JN to legitimize their role in the civil war.
While all of these groups prioritize violent jihad, and struggle against those who they
render enemies of their fundamentalist form of Islam, they argue about who qualifies as an
eligible target. The central focus of this eligibility criterion is the concept of takfir, or the Islamic
practice of identifying and excommunicating current Muslims as infidels within the religion.154
The legally-based principle of takfir is highly condemned within mainstream Islam, even
amongst the most conservative sects.155 The act of labeling certain Muslims as kufr- or
religiously impure individuals- is one of the most egregious condemnations amongst militant
Salafi-jihadist groups. People who are labeled as major unbelievers are thus deemed to be
unworthy of living within the bounds of the Islamic State that these organizations ultimately
uphold as the final sacred goal of the collective.156 The proclamation of takfir is thus weaponized
to explicitly delineate boundaries between group members and those who don’t belong in the
community of righteous Muslims, and operationally serves to justify the killing of the outgroup
based on ancient, sacred principles.157
The organizational division between the JN and IS is foregrounded by a series of intrafactional ideological divides in the Salafi jihadist camp that occurred before the civil war and
exist beyond the borders of Syria. The split between these groups is most comprehensively
explained as a division between organizations like JN that profess a commitment to AQ’s
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“moderate” interpretation of jihad, and groups like IS that have adopted more extreme visions
regarding the purpose of jihad. A comprehensive way to illustrate the full history of this schism
is to detail the ideology of AQ, which for decades has represented the “hub” of traditional Salafi
jihadist thought and practices that affiliated “spoke” groups such as JN have sought to directly
replicate. After establishing the context of Salafi jihadist norms practiced by AQ, deviance from
this ideology demonstrated by radical groups like IS can be better defined and analyzed.
AQ is a transnational non-state terrorist organization that aims to create a collective
identity around the Salafi jihadist ideology, which is a belief system that espouses “respect for
the sacred texts in their most literal form and an absolute commitment to jihad.”158 While AQ
does not prioritize state-building projects, it does aspire to be the vanguard of the Muslim
community, by appealing to the “hearts and minds” of fellow Muslims to achieve their
endorsement and to unite the global Muslim community under the same initiative of pursuing
Global jihad in resistance to Western forces159 To signify AQ’s commitment to leading the
unification process amongst the populations in Muslim countries in the Middle East and North
Africa, the successor to bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri released a communique instructing AQ
forces to refrain from targeting ordinary non-Muslim populations such as Christians, Sikhs, and
Hindus.160 Furthermore, Zawahiri refrained from insinuating that these groups were undeserving
of living in an Ummah, and even stated “we are keen to live with them in a peaceful manner after
an Islamic state is established.”161
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The AQ brand of Salafi jihadism rests on a platform characterized by reliance on literal
interpretations of the Qur’an and aspirations to unite the Muslim diaspora under a consensus for
establishment of the Ummah. The organization predominantly avoids declaring takfir on
Muslims living in the Islamic world that do not work directly for “apostate” Muslim
governments. In an attempt to not alienate public support from the movement, AQ has made
efforts to avoid rhetorically condemning and physically attacking citizens of Middle Eastern
nations who are not employed by state security forces. AQ is mainly fixated on committing
atrocities abroad against the Western “far enemy,” such as the infamous attacks upon the US
World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001. However, the group believes that avoiding mass
casualty attacks against civilians in the Middle East is essential to attract Muslim public support
that will prolong the viability of the group.
AQ is an increasingly decentralized organization that has pursued a hybrid “glocal”
strategy.162 AQ central prioritizes globalized aspirations to target the “far enemy,” or the “head
of (international) disbelief, America and its ally Israel.”163 It also endorses local militant groups
that attack local governments that have instituted laws inspired by American values, such as
secular government and democratic elections.164 To promote AQ’s goal of gaining notoriety as
leader of a global radical Islamist movement, the group made concerted efforts to affiliate with
jihadist groups abroad that were fighting against state regimes perceived to be manipulated by
Western secular powers.165 These far-flung branches of AQ have often proved to be liabilities for
AQ’s brand, as their beliefs have evolved separately from the tenets of AQ central and their
targeting patterns have decoupled with AQ’s agenda to ensure long-term organizational viability.
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Several of these groups that have historically been linked to AQ now align closely with an ultraextremist brand of jihad- Neo-Takfirism.166
The Origins of Neo-Takfiri Ideology
Groups that adopt Neo-Takfiri thought have taken the ideational leap to identify all those
who do not ascribe to their puritanical belief system as kufr (infidels) and worthy of death.167
More specifically, Neo-Takfiris ascribe to the zero-sum conviction that any non-combatant that
does not support their dominant rule by sharia law is an enemy of the group and a heretical
Muslim. This ideology contrasts the conviction of most Salafi-jihadists that violence to establish
the Islamic State can only be justified within the legal principles of jihad. Neo-Takfiris instead
consider their extreme adherence to Islamic piety as validation that they are the “chosen people”
who can rely on their basic internal instincts rather than external legal reasoning to determine
who is classified as an infidel.168
The pursuit of takfir is not a uniquely modern endeavor. In the seventh century, the
historically notorious Khawarij sect excommunicated and killed Muslims that they deemed as
heretics.169 This ancient sect acted to “establish pure Islam and induce among people a kind of
fear of god.”170 Currently, most mainstream Salafi-jihadist groups condemn excessive takfir, and
accuse Neo-Takfiri groups of enacting a modern form of Khawarij-style indiscriminate
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brutality.171 AQ’s most current leader al-Zawahiri, joined prominent Salafi scholars in
condemning the Islamic State’s Neo-Takfiri practices by equating them to the “Kharijites.”172
Modern Neo-Takfiri movements have been inspired by 20th century Muslim Brotherhood
scholar Sayyid Qutb, who promoted two key interpretations of jihad that diverge from preceding
theorists. First, Qutb reasoned that not only state regimes could be accused of apostasy, but any
civilians that were governed by such regimes could also be categorized as infidels.173 Second,
Qutb emphasized that targeting the “near enemy,” classified as non-believing regimes and people
in the Middle East and North Africa, should be the first target of jihadist groups.174 This
prioritization of warfare in the Middle East clashes with AQ’s belief that waging a war against
the “far enemy” on American soil should be the first objective of jihad. By declaring the world
order to be in a state of jahiliyah, or as ignorant as societies prior to the dawn of Islam, Qutb
argued that Muslims must wage an “offensive” jihad against all who did not actively support the
return of the radical Islamist establishment of regional dominance.175 According to Zenn and
Pieri, takfirism serves to justify “clear and direct paths to brutal violence directed against
Muslims who refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the (aggressor’s) movement.”176
The immediate extermination of the “near enemy” is viewed by takfiri ideologues as a
means of violent societal purification and transformation that will foreground a second
immediate goal: a near-future state-building project that will fulfill Islamic scriptural predictions
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exhorting a utopian Islamic State modeled after Muhammad’s Medina caliphate will be
established in the modern era. Furthermore, the creation of the utopia, referred to in Islamic
sacred scripts as the Ummah is also predicted to trigger an anti-Islam Crusader versus Muslim
battle that will culminate in the “end of times” or the apocalypse. Excommunicating other
Muslims through the declaration of takfir is strongly discouraged in the Hadith, which is a sacred
collection of the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings. The Hadith stipulates that the Prophet
Muhammad once said, “when a man calls his brother an unbeliever, it returns at least to one of
them,” which is followed by the warning that “either the accuser is as claimed, or the charge will
turn against the accuser.”177
As Neo-Takfiri groups operate with the goal of establishing dominant Islamic rule over
territory, a noticeable pattern of organizational isolation and avoidance of regional jihadist
affiliates emerges. Particularly isolated Salafi jihadist organizations that repeatedly declare takfir,
commit widespread ethnic cleansing, and aim to immediately declare an Islamic caliphate. These
groups have been categorized by Anthony Celso as constructing an entirely new phase of
terrorist norms separate from AQ. Celso argues that an emergent “fifth wave” of Islamist
terrorist groups, constitutes a new installment to David Rappoport’s four wave theory of modern
terrorism trends, which are categorized into cycles of anarchist, colonial, left-revolutionary, and
Islamist sequences. 178 He argues that this “fifth wave” Islamist groups are ideologically and
behaviorally distinct from the rationale of AQ, which represents the precursory “fourth wave” of
terrorist ideology. Celso’s theory underlines the central argument of this thesis that AQ has a
specific pragmatic ideology that is distinctively different from its more assertive affiliates.
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However, this paper examines the ideological nuances between groups that are often classified
under Rappaport’s general typology that “prescribe different strategies and institutions.”179 The
distinctions between “fourth wave” factions of Salafi jihadists that align with AQ’s ideological
program and the “fifth wave” Neo-Takfiri groups that are particularly brutal and isolated, are
thrown into relief by the following schisms between Salafi jihadist movements in Algeria, the
Sahel region, and Iraq.
The Algerian experience
Salafi jihadist groups that led an Islamist rebellion against the secular Algerian state in
the 1990’s exemplified how ideational goals of an organization prompts an expansion or
limitation of potential non-combatant targets for Islamist militias. Thousands of fighters
originating from Algeria fought abroad in Afghanistan under the banner of violent jihad, with the
goal of defending Muslim lands against external Soviet forces in the 1980’s.180 Upon returning to
North Africa, veteran Algerian Islamist militants who were deeply dedicated to ensuring that
Muslim nations instituted fundamentalist Islamic governance were dismayed by the ruling
regime of their nation that did not govern under a strict code of Islamic law. The newly
established Islamist political party Front Islamic de Salut (FIS) claimed multiple victories in the
1992 elections. Yet when the FIS was subsequently repressed from political participation by the
Algerian state, the nation plummeted into civil war between armed jihadist factions and the
government.181 The operationally experienced jihadists who fought in Afghanistan several years
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earlier led the militarized Islamist insurgency against the Algerian state under the organizational
name Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA).
When the FIS refrained from launching violent jihad against government forces in protest
to the blocked election results, the GIA independently intervened to dominate the Algerian
insurgency, by distinguishing itself with a virulent, extremist interpretation of jihad. Rather than
just naming the state forces as enemies, the GIA adopted a takfiri ideology, which not only
targets the state regime as a threat to Islamic jihad, but also labeled non-Salafi civilians as
infidels or kuffar, and ideologically legitimized these passive “non-believers” as worthy targets
of violence.182
In 1993, the GIA expanded its attacks beyond “military personnel and government
officials to include intellectuals, journalists, tourists, and civilians.”183 From 1992 to 1998, the
number of Islamist attacks in Algeria against foreigners, intellectuals, and journalists, the
majority of which are attributed to the GIA, totaled 365 incidents.184 In comparison, the rate of
violent incidents perpetrated by the GIA-dominant insurgency against government officials,
police, and security forces amounted to 246 incidents.185 There has been some speculation that
the Algerian state infiltrated the GIA ranks or framed the Islamists to blame them for these
deaths, but sources in Algeria who bore witness to the conflict state otherwise. The emir
(commander in chief) of the al-Rahman militia that divorced from the GIA in 1995 attested that
the group massacred families of Laarba militia members that abandoned the GIA during the
conflict. Furthermore, former GIA emir Hassan Hattab stated that he broke with the GIA due to
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their “spilling of the blood of (Algeria), looting its property, and kidnapping its women.”186 In
September of 1995, the GIA released a statement that it would rape and kill anyone who opposed
it.187
It became especially clear that takfiri ideology was a grounding element of GIA
operations in 1997. The GIA issued a statement declaring that “the infidelism (kufr) and apostasy
of this hypocrite nation...will not hurt us at all...all the kidnappings and slaughter, the massacres,
the displacement of people, the burnings, and the kidnappings...are an offering to God.”188 As a
consequence of the “bloody massacres of civilians” that the GIA was widely believed to have
committed, public support for the broader jihadist movement weakened.189
In opposition to the GIA’s exploitation of Islamist ideology to justify violence against
non-combatant targets, and in an attempt to recover support from former civilians that once
voted for an Islamic party, the FIS formally established the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) in
1994.190 The AIS charter blatantly opposed the GIA’s ultraviolent campaign that monopolized
the jihadi resistance movement and sought to discredit all other rebel factions.191 In addition, the
AIS emphasized that it would only render state employees as kufr, and justifiable targets of
attack, if they continued to work for the government. The differences between these two jihadist
groups prompted the GIA to declare war against the AIS in January of 1996.192 In an effort to
attract moderate Islamist fighters to AIS ranks, the militia’s leaders emphasized the divergent
ideologies that led to the different targeting patterns of the two groups. In one open letter by
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Madani Mezraq, the AIS emir, warned Algerian jihadists to be wary of the GIA’s interpretation
of jihad as a limitless tool of violence, that aimlessly excommunicated non-combatants and
justified the murder of the “old, women, or children.”193
Boko Haram
Boko Haram has been over-generalized as an existing product of the trans-nationalization
of AQ’s anti-Western ideology, because the Salafi-jihadist organization initially followed the AQ
agenda by targeting exclusively Western entities and local state “apostate” governments in the
Sahel. Boko Haram began as the Nigerian Taliban, which was founded in the 1990’s by
Muhammed Ali, who networked with Bin Laden to achieve a three million dollar sponsorship
from AQ to establish a jihadist organization in North Africa.194 In the early 2000’s, the Nigerian
Taliban promoted AQ’s anti-Western strategy by aiding their plans to conduct attacks on
exclusively Western targets in Nigeria, several of which were intercepted by counterterrorism
agencies in 2003.195 When Ali was killed in 2003 by Nigerian State forces, jihadist Mohammad
Yusuf took command of the group, and made efforts to transform the movement into one that not
only sought to perpetrate attacks against Westerners in Nigeria, but also an organization that
targeted the Nigerian government for its complicity in Western political influence.196 To
emphasize his ideological orientation, Yusuf labeled the Nigerian government taghut, translated
in Arabic as tyrant or oppressor, and condemned individuals who worked for the state, but never
declared takfir against ordinary Nigerian Muslims.
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Yusuf’s threats of militant action against the state resulted in him being targeted and
killed by the Nigerian army July of 2009. His successor, Abubakar Shekau, re-branded the
groups as Jamaat Ahl as-Sunnah Lid dawa wa al-Jihad (Sunni Group for Proselytization and
Jihad) or “JAS.” Shekau’s JAS adopted a far more expansive approach to declaring takfir.
Shekau declared that “jihad after 2010 was obligatory, and that not actively joining his jihad was
tantamount to apostasy.”197 In January of 2012, Shekau ordered a devastating terrorist attack in
the ethnically diverse city of Kano that killed 185 civilians.198 Boko Haram’s spokesperson later
clarified the group’s willingness to attack any religious identity, if that individual “collaborated
in arresting or killing us even if he is a Muslim.”199 The group’s increase in takfiri rhetoric,
heightened rates of violence against innocent civilians, and “undisguised ambition” to establish
an Islamic governing province in Nigeria contradicted bin Laden’s approaches to jihad.
In 2012, Shekau proclaimed “Shiites are infidels! Whoever follows democracy is a
disbeliever! My brothers, there is no rest, go out, kill, slay! That’s religion.”200 According to the
GTD, approximately half of attacks between 2012 to 2014 were directed against civilians, while
less than a quarter attacked militia forces.201 This violence did not even spare Sunni Muslims and
parallels the rate of violence against civilians perpetrated by the Islamic State.202 Shekau
demanded that Muslim “vigilantes” repent and threatened “even if you don’t do anything to us
we will kill you.”203
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To oppose Shekau’s indiscriminate approach to violence, Ansarul al-Muslimin fi Biladis
Sudan (Vanguard of Muslims in Black Africa) was formed.204 The militant organization avoided
rhetorically branding any local Nigerian Muslims that did not resist the rule of the state regime.
This group expressed loyalty to AQ and was formed to contest affiliates of the Islamic State in
Nigeria, such as Shekau’s brutal movement.205
Al Qaeda in Iraq
In 2003, a Jordanian jihadist named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi took advantage of the
political power vacuum that culminated in Iraq after the US invasion and the toppling of
Saddam’s Sunni regime by establishing a predecessor militant group to IS in the country.206 In
September of 2004, Zarqawi pledged his group’s allegiance to AQ, and his group was christened
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) based on the understanding that al-Zarqawi would wage jihad against
American forces in the region.207 AQI was of particular interest to AQ, because it is the territorial
location of the former Abbasid Caliphate, which all Salafi-jihadists collectively pursue to
recreate. If AQ could claim credit for orchestrating the exodus of Western military influence
from the region, the group could prove its capacity to target the “far enemy” American forces,
ground legitimacy amongst the Salafi-jihadist community, and demonstrate its capability on the
international stage.208
Yet, Zarqawi had greater ambitions to ignite a sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunni
Muslims in the region, and to establish an Islamic State as soon as possible in Iraq. He felt that
the ultimate means to establish a utopic Islamic territory was through purging captured land of
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any “unbelieving” residents. Whereas top AQ officials believed that the ordinary citizens were
not the problem, but that Western institutions in the region needed to be uprooted and replaced
with fundamental Islamic institutions.209
To the dismay of AQ, under Zarqawi’s instruction AQI began killing Shia Muslims and
any Sunni tribes that stood in their way of establishing a sharia-based Islamic dominion in Iraqi
territory. In response to AQI’s broad declarations of takfir and perpetrations of violence against
civilians, prominent Salafi-jihadist Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi wrote an open letter to Zarqawi
“Al-Zarqawi-Support and Advice, Hopes and Pains,” in which he stated: “He (Zarqawi) must
exercise the utmost care not to shed the blood of Muslims, even if they are sinners. He must be
cognizant of the obvious distinction between war in the original abode of kufr (i.e. lands that
have never been under Islamic rule), whose dwellers are-mostly infidels, and a war in which the
renewed abode of kufr (i.e. Muslim lands that were once subject to sharia rule but are no longer
so) whose dwellers are mostly adherents of Islam.” 210
While arguing that the image of the Salafi-jihadist movement is tarnished globally when
AQI targets noncombatant Iraqi Shia, al-Maqdisi also emphasized that declaring that all Muslims
living under apostate regimes are infidels has “nothing to do with Islamic political thought.”211
Zarqawi’s efforts to establish an Islamic State in Iraq eventually “turned Sunni leaders...and led
to his betrayal and death.”212 Al Zarqawi responded with an inflammatory voice message in
2005, in which he claimed that the Shia initiated the battles between his AQI, and that when the
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US recruited Iraqi people to contribute to militias and infrastructures that countered jihadist
movements, “people responded to their call, betrayed their religion, and relinquished their divine
reward...they have committed apostasy and allied with the Crusaders.”213
The emergent fault lines between more moderate Salafi-jihadists and ultraconservative
Neo-Takfiri sects are evident in the evolution of radical Islamic groups dispersed across the
MENA. There are overarching commonalities between radical groups across the region that
aspire to establish immediate rule over territory, frequently declare takfir, and commit higher
rates of violence against civilians compared to their attacks on secular state forces in the region.
Groups that adhere to this unforgiving brand of Islamic rule consistently clash rhetorically and
militarily with ‘moderate’ factions in the Salafi jihadist movement that aim to stabilize the image
of their sect as a viable, and pragmatic Islamic militia. With this reliable public image, Salafi
jihadists believe that their brand can establish a “balanced” caliphate with popular support. By
staging these decades-long divides in the Salafi-jihadist community, the following study will
contextualize the current dynamics between JN and IS in the Syrian civil war by comparing their
respective English-language magazines.
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3
CONTENT ANALYSIS
The essential schism between IS and JN is evidenced through how these jihadist groups
use ideology as a tool to justify their violence and structure a counternarrative against actors that
oppose their behavior. Both insurgencies justify their involvement in the Syrian civil war by
rhetorically pinpointing their role in the conflict. JN portrays itself as a mediator: a pragmatic
group that contrasts the reckless airstrike, chemical weapon, and explosive device campaigns of
the Assad Regime and IS. On the other hand, IS portrays itself as a purist actor that is rightfully
claiming dominance over all independent actors in the security environment. The actions of IS
are rationalized on the premise of preserving the caliphate and expanding the current version of
IS-implemented sharia law. The roles that these groups claim to fulfill in the civil war is realized
through their strategic use of force. In other words, JN makes an argument for Syrian supporters
by portraying its violence as calculated and controlled: selectively directed against IS, Iranian,
Hezbollah, and Syrian state forces that militarily oppose JN in the civil war. In contrast, IS
frames violence as the primary and most effective means to offensively achieve the territorial
establishment of a prophesied caliphate. Any actor who challenges the imperative of IS to
maximize territorial expansion is thus categorized as an existential threat to the mission of the
group, and a worthy target.
According to Abrahms and Potter, highly centralized terrorist groups “should be less
likely to attack civilians when leaders publicly oppose this practice, though the ability to impose
this preference should be conditional on their (operational) strength.”214 JN’s behavior has been
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consistent with this claim. After the nascent organization killed hundreds of civilians in
Damascus in 2012, JN deliberately restrained its mass casualty attacks as it accumulated
influence in northwest Syria. Contrary to this pattern, IS progressively integrated violence into
its public propaganda releases as it gained operational strength in Iraq and swept through Syria.
A content analysis of IS and JN magazine articles offers crucial insights into each group’s
distinctive ideological approach to Salafi jihadism. These stances motivate an instrumental utility
for using violence against civilians in the case of IS, or an imperative to limit excessive violence
for JN.
The online publication format offers a unique insight into the worldview of a Salafi
jihadist group. A 2018 report by the U.S. Army War and College Press that analyzed English
language online magazines produced by multiple jihadist groups states that these publications
“promote a specific jihadi culture, to be embraced in total by followers of the particular group in
question in order to achieve its desired utopian vision.”215 Furthermore, magazines produced by
the official media wings of each militia deliver a coherent narrative to a global audience of
potential supporters, and thus capture the precise ideational perspective that the group seeks to
project. This media source is thus preferable to online radical Islamist chat forums that are
interrupted by conflicting discussions between a milieu of participants with varying commitment
to the organization.216 These long-form issues encapsulate a collective worldview that clipped
statements from leadership cannot convey.
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The English-language magazines that will be analyzed in this study are the IS
publications Dabiq and Rumiyah, and the JN magazine Al-Risalah. IS began publishing Dabiq in
July of 2014, soon after Baghdadi announced the establishment of the caliphate.217 The magazine
is named after a town in Syria that is symbolically significant to IS, because it is the location
where an “End of Days” battle is prophesied to occur between Christians and Muslims. In mid
2016 IS lost control over the town of Dabiq, prompting their media wing to christen the
magazine “Rumiyah,” the ancient Arabic term for Rome. This rebranding represents the group’s
effort to internationalize attacks against “Crusaders” abroad as the group lost its territorial
stronghold in Syria.218 JN’s magazine Al-Risalah is simply titled after the Arabic word for “a
letter.” The latter publication has been released in four installments between July of 2015 to
January of 2017. To accurately compare the content produced by each group, two Dabiq and two
Rumiyah magazines produced by IS were selected to temporally correspond to the same time
periods of the JN magazine releases. It is important to note that these publications are distributed
to predominantly English-speaking supporters abroad rather than operatives in Syria. However,
the format of publications that were released along a similar timeline, written for similar
audiences, and are produced by the official media wings of both groups make these magazines
ideal comparative mediums of propaganda for an ideologically-focused study.
Methods of Content Analysis
The content analysis methods of this study are influenced by Ingram’s comparative study
of the IS magazine Dabiq and the AQ magazine Inspire. Ingram’s research uses narrative
analysis to examine articles, statements, and advertisements in both of these publications, with
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the objective of determining how each group “radicalizes'' their readership. Taking into account
JN’s affinity for AQ’s model of jihad, along with the group’s shared ideological opposition to
IS’s establishment of the caliphate, this research serves as a thematically appropriate method of
analysis for this thesis. Ingram argues that the nuances within each group’s messaging “acts as a
‘lens’ through which to shape their supporter’s perceptions, polarize their support, and,
ultimately, convince(s) them to mobilize.”219 Drawing upon the theory that ideology is
manifested in structures and action, this analysis notes the differences in “competitive systems of
meaning” established by group magazines, and relates texts to the ultimate decision-making
processes of violent groups.220
This study will follow Ingram’s relational construction of ingroup, outgroup, solution,
and crisis themes through the use of value-, dichotomy-, and crisis- reinforcing narratives.221 The
“values” narrative characterizes the ingroup as a positive solution-oriented movement, or the
outgroup as a negatively portrayed key perpetrator of the crisis. This category of articles
reinforces that either the ingroup is imbued with good qualities, or the outgroup is laden with
undesirable traits. The “dichotomy” narrative stages deep contrasts between group values and
final tangible outcomes. This category either presents “good” ingroup values in reference to the
“bad” outgroup values, or stages how the ingroup’s solution creates a sense of certainty for the
community. The “crisis” narrative ties those within the ingroup who are perceived to not be
faithful to the ideology as traitors. This classification is one that directly relates to the topics that
drive a wedge between groups such as IS and JN that belong to the greater Salafi-jihadist camp
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yet view each other as misguided actors that threaten the whole sect with their unique ideological
stances. Articles that fixated on plotted attacks, battle tactics, weapons, and group-instituted
governance are classified as “Operational.”
These magazines encapsulate the “image” that IS and JN seek to emulate for current and
potential supporters. By contrasting these common mediums of magazine propaganda, the
ideological schism between these two actors is evident in their visions of the duty of Salafi
jihadists in the Syrian civil war. These divergent representations of IS in Dabiq or Rumiyah and
JN in Al-Risalah apply to the implications of ideology presented by Sanin and Wood in their
extension of the chocolate eater metaphor: that if an entity externally projects a certain selfimage, the behaviors they advertise will affect their engagement with the specific practices in
question, such as eating chocolate.222 Thus, if the magazines adhere to a coherent messaging
strategy, the military operations they publicize will mirror to the specific practices that they
rhetorically defend as “legitimate” jihadist behavior in the Syrian civil war.
Table 1.
Issue # (Group)
Al-Risalah Issue 1 (JN)223

222

223

Title

Release Date

“Al-Risalah”

July 2015

Sanin and Wood, "Ideology in civil war: Instrumental adoption and beyond." 214.
“New issue of the magazine: Al-Risalah #1” jihadology.net. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, July 4, 2015
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Al-Risalah Issue 2 (JN)224

“Victory Loves
Preparation”

October 2015

Al-Risalah Issue 3 (JN)225

“Has the Time Not
Come?”

August 2016

Al-Risalah Issue 4 (JN)226

“The Balanced Nation”

January 2017

Dabiq Issue 10 (IS)227

“The Law of Allah or the
Laws of Men”

July 2015

224

“New issue of the magazine: Al-Risalah #2” jihadology.net. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, October 25, 2015

225

“New issue of the magazine: Al-Risalah #3” jihadology.net. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, August 1, 2016.
“New issue of the magazine: Al-Risalah #4” jihadology.net. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, January 10, 2017
227
“New release of the Islamic State’s Magazine: Dabiq #10” jihadology.net. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, July 13,
2015
226
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Dabiq Issue 12 (IS)228

“Just Terror”

November 2015

Rumiyah Issue 2 (IS)229

“Muharram”

October 2016

Rumiyah Issue 5 (IS)230

“Rabi al-Akhir”

January 2017

“New release of the Islamic State’s Magazine: Dabiq #12” jihadology.net. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, November
18th, 2015
228

229

“New release of the Islamic State’s Magazine: ‘Rome #2’” jihadology.net. Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, October 4,
2016.
230
“New release of the Islamic State’s Magazine: Rome #5” jihadology.net Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, January 6,
2017.
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Results
Articles
Table 2 presents the results of the narrative analysis of Al-Risalah, Dabiq, and Rumiyah
according to Ingram’s classifications. The sample of selected magazines from the media outlets
of JN and IS coincidentally featured the same number of articles: 51 in total for each group
respectively. Content from Al-Risalah weighs heavily on the value-reinforcing narrative of Ingroup-Solution messaging, which is the focus of 45% of the publication’s articles. The secondmost frequent topic is the crisis-reinforcing narrative of In-group/Perception of Crisis, which
ranks at 16% of articles. In contrast, themes in Dabiq and Rumiyah are more dispersed, with the
most common topic being related to the In-group/Perception of Crisis narrative at 25%, which is
closely followed by Operational articles at 22%.
Statements and Advertisements
Unlike articles, the rate of statement and advertisements are not equal across the sample
issues produced by JN and IS media wings. While a total of 38 short-form items were
incorporated into the pages of the Al-Risalah sample, Dabiq and Rumiyah selections collectively
featured 29 statements and ads. The content profile of statements and advertisements in AlRisalah is similar to the publication’s article composition. The In-group/Solution messaging as
the most common at 37%, succeeded by 24% of statements and ads related to Ingroup/Perception of crisis. Last, the narrow majority of statements and ads in Rumiyah and
Dabiq are Operational and make up 51% of category content. A distant second is Ingroup/Solution content which is a mere 13% of statements and ads.
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Overview
Articles, statements, and advertisements coded as “values” narratives feature a primary
focus on descriptions of the attributes of the internal organization, and how these demonstrated
values guide the political movement to success. For example, an article that fixates on the
virtuous qualities of faith, honor, and integrity that an individual can manifest through joining the
organization would be categorized as an In-group/Solution messaging tactic. Martyrdom articles
are a quintessential example of how jihadist groups imply that membership and dedication to the
ingroup is interconnected to righteousness. On a collective scale, Al-Risalah articles rely on
interpretations from a range of Islamic scholars that encourage each reader to value their
“individual duty” to jihad by joining or donating to JN. IS publications explicate a set of divine
“laws of Allah” implemented by IS authorities that the group renders as superior to the “laws of
men” followed by groups that refuse to recognize IS as a legitimate government.231 Thus, items
that focus on the negative values of the outgroup suggest detrimental qualities that make the
actor in question an existential threat. Ads of President Obama with photo editing that demonizes
his visage would fall into this category.
Items in the sample coded as “dichotomy” narratives explicitly reference tangible
breakdowns in tradition related to the activities of the outgroup, and the ways in which ingroup
values could restore tradition, or a physical ingroup solution provides a final solution to the
crisis. It is important to note that the In-group/Out-group dichotomization does not include IS
and JN’s attacks upon other Salafi jihadists, and rather fixates on Shia sects, the Assad regime,
Western forces, and other groups that do not adhere to Sunni Islam. For example, a segment that
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details a group-member’s former life experiences suffering under a non-Muslim government, and
then transitions to describe the individual’s sense of belonging after migrating to join the ranks
of the jihadist organization would be classified under the In-group/Out-group category. Items
coded as Solution/Perception of crisis reference a specific long-established grievance shared
amongst the ingroup, and a clear-cut argument for how an organizational plan of action directly
solves the dilemma in question. Items in this category stage a crisis such as the “improper”
implementation of sharia law, women’s use of birth control, and laxity in punishing perceived
enemies to Sunni Islam. Following an argument for the crisis, the article must also contain a
contrasting segment that demonstrates an ingroup answer to the issue. IS particularly relies on
the authoritative operations of the caliphate to exemplify ways in which the implementation of
ultraconservative sharia law addresses outgroup practices that they perceive to be misguided.
Items classified as crisis-narratives feature an organization’s argument to Salafi-jihadists
that their membership forms the legitimate embodiment of the movement, and that oppositional
groups in the sect exhibit behaviors that are detrimental to the entire movement. For IS, this
messaging frames AQ, JN, and other radical Islamists in the Syrian civil war as infidels that are
unwilling to submit to true sharia law because they will not recognize IS as a caliphate. JN
segments present a counternarrative by framing IS as ultraviolent actors that illegitimately
established an Islamic State without widespread Muslim consensus. Finally, Operational items
exhibited straightforward demonstrations of jihadist warfare, tactics, and governance.
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Table 2.
Item Type Primary Focus
Article

Advertisement/
Statements

In-group/Solution
Other/Perceptions of
Crisis
In-group/Other
Solution/Perception of
Crisis
In-group/Perception of
Crisis
Operational
Total Articles

Al-Risalah number (%)

Dabiq/Rumiyah number (%)

(23) 45%
(4) 8%

(10) 20%
(3) 6%

(5) 10%
(4) 8%

(4) 8%
(10) 20%

(8) 16%

(13) 25%

(7) 13%
(51)

(11) 22%
(51)

In-group/Solution

(14) 37%

(4) 13%

Other/Perceptions of
Crisis
In-group/Other

(7) 18%

(3) 10%

(1) 3%

(3) 10%

Solution/Perception of
Crisis
In-group/Perception of
Crisis
Operational
Total Ads/Statements

(2) 7%
(9) 24%

(2) 7%

(7) 18%
(38)

(15) 51%
(29)

The sample of English-language magazines produced by IS and JN are comparable in
their high-caliber written and visual segments. The issues are similar to the format of a magazine
that could be found on any metropolitan newsstand in the world. Six of the eight issues analyzed
feature a front page with a table of contents except the issues of Rumiyah, which incorporate
both segments on the first page. Each installment features a Letter from the Editor or a Foreword
that stages the group’s initial message for supporters. Every magazine in the sample also
incorporates interview segments with operatives from allied organizations.
These pieces function to demonstrate each group’s connectivity to a trans-national camp
of militants that share their ideological vision for the Salafi-jihadist movement. In addition, each
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magazine features one to three martyrdom, or Shuhada articles. These segments typically follow
the same rhetorical formula across all installments from IS and JN. They describe the militant’s
basic origin story, their daily attention to Islamic scripture, which signals their status as a “good
Muslim,” and the details of their suicide operation. A tone of glorification finalizes the legacy of
each deceased operative, upholding them as an immortalized figure in the group, and an
individual who achieved the paradise of afterlife, known as Jannah through jihad. It is important
to note that the martyrdom mission segments in the sample killed members of opposition forces
during battle, rather than civilians. However, martyrdom narratives are an essential example of
how these organizations celebrate violence against combatants and morally disengage members
from using force during military engagement. In regard to segments that self-report violence
against non-combatants, multiple articles from IS’s issues of Dabiq and Rumiyah feature
dispatches about attacks against civilians conducted by operatives in countries ranging from
Bangladesh, Tunisia, France, and the US. Therefore, unlike JN’s resistance to publicizing any
reports of violence against civilians, IS pursues international notoriety by encouraging its
English readership network to kill citizens abroad.
The pages of each magazine feature poignant photographs and graphic designs that
signify the professionality of each organization’s media wings. Statements are foregrounded by
images that reinforce the tone of each short message. Images of armed militants are used to
signal the operational capacity of the group, and photos of fighters celebrating a battlefield
victory in Syria promise rewards to prospective foreign fighters. Advertisements, though concise,
are informative and compelling. Items range from scriptural quotes that rationalize the conduct
of the organization, to segments that promote other web productions from the media wing, to
provocative images that vilify the perceived outgroup. In JN’s case, these ads feature the faces of
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prominent leaders of enemy forces, such as Obama, Assad, Putin, Baghdadi, and Hassan
Nasrallah, the Leader of Hezbollah, edited in shadows or flames that convey their demonized
status. In contrast, IS ads are less likely to name prominent actors for targeting, and more
commonly feature images of a general, unnamed population that they deem apostates. Notably,
many images that accompany the written content of Dabiq and Rumiyah include anonymous
captives being held at gunpoint or being beheaded.232 These ultraviolent images thus sanction
violence against an undefined outgroup, that is not constrained by religious or national identity.
Rather, it deems anyone who challenges the authority of the caliphate as worthy of death.
The Caliphate
The textual analysis will begin with considering how IS and JN address the broadest, and
most fundamental debate amongst Salafi jihadists in their publications- the appropriate timing to
declare a caliphate. The structural realization of these group’s ideologies is the prioritization of
establishing a caliphate in the immediate short term, or the long term. The implications of this
stance directly inform the organizational decision to declare or to not declare an Islamic state,
which informs a group’s basic self-concept regarding its authority to monopolize the use of force
against civilians.
IS places the utmost value on proving its legitimacy as a caliphate. The group’s media
wing operationalizes propaganda of the word and deed to erase any doubt among radical
Islamists that Baghdadi’s group has fully implemented a precise style of governance that was
practiced by the first generations of Muslims. Therefore, by referencing the territorialization of
the caliphate, IS argues that all actions perpetrated by the organization manifests perfect Islamic
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rule. Consequently, any Muslim or non-Muslim that does not vehemently support the dominance
of the Islamic State is rendered as an existential threat to the group’s “ideal” brand of Islam.
IS relies on an ideological lens that communicates a bipolar worldview for its followers:
demonstrate dedication to the insular caliphate or be rendered as an enemy worthy of death. This
stance is reflected in the strategic placement of references from Islamic scripture and images of
executions perpetrated by IS against unidentified prisoners. For example, an article in Rumiyah
titled “Brutality and Severity towards the Kuffar” is framed with two images of beheadings of
men who are simply labeled as the mushkrin- the Arabic term for polytheist. The article itself
details the ways Abu Bakr Siddiq, the Prophet Muhammad’s top political advisor, dealt with
Arab tribes that defied the Prophet’s rule. The passage states that Siddiq,
“…remained determined to fight the murtaddin who resisted a single, clearcut law of Islam... He went out, seeking any of those murtaddin from the dispersed,
defeated army, and made examples of them, exacting vengeance on them...“So he
spent one month, seeking revenge for the Muslims who were living amongst these
tribes when the tribes apostatized. Some of them he burned with fire; others he
smashed with stones; others he threw from atop the highest mountains.”233
The article finishes with a stark conclusion for its readership by stating, “Whoever wishes
to follow them (the murtaddin, or apostates) will be guided and saved. And whoever wants to
follow another path, then Allah will leave him to what he chose of deviant methodologies and
deviating sects.”234 In order for the caliphate to maintain an image of sanctified supremacy, it
must demand obedience to the state and exert the right to condemn all deviant groups. As
evidenced in Table 2, 20% of articles from Dabiq and Rumiyah present the dichotomized
narrative of Solution/Perception of Crisis while 8% of JN’s Al-Risalah articles reference this
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topic. This discrepancy is due to IS’s claim to have already founded a “solution” through its
state-building measures. Therefore, when territory is seized, sharia is implemented, and the land
is cleansed of “impure” populations through violence, IS demonstrates its organizational
prowess.
In contrast, JN uses its media platform to frame the group as a locally-focused jihadist
organization that espouses the immediate goal of defeating the Assad regime on behalf of the
Sunni Syrian population. In fact, JN does not exercise a drastically-polarized “us vs. them”
approach to the conflict and adopts the attitude that like-minded groups in the opposition have to
cooperate to win the Syrian civil war. In fact, in the first issue of Al-Risalah, an announcement
confirms JN’s merger with groups under the Jaish al-Fath umbrella organization that subsumes
other Sunni jihadist groups.235 In the Editor’s Note, JN’s leader Jolani states, the groups in Jaish
al Fath “are all Muslims, even if they differ somewhat with us. There are some groups which
have some mistakes, we overlook these mistakes, we overlook these mistakes, because of the
enormous severity of the battle,”236 These groups coordinated in August of 2016 to capture the
Assad-held city of Aleppo. It has been reported that Syrian forces repelled the insurgents with
chlorine attacks.237
Articles in JN’s publications utilize sacred passages from the Qur’an and the Hadith to
reinforce the importance of a Muslim’s obligation to embark on “individual jihad,” a tenet that
Salafi jihadists consider as a religious imperative equivalent to that of fasting during Ramadan.
To encourage readers to join the ranks in Syria, the pages of Al-Risalah utilize a quote from the
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Messenger of Allah, which states, “standing in the ranks of the army in the battlefield is better to
Allah than the worship of sixty years.”238 Furthermore, the rhetoric applied to justify JN’s jihad
is based on the defense of the common Muslim. One passage states:
“enemies of Allah have invaded, divided up and looted Muslim wealth and land,
and the honor of women, children and elderly are violated in the most unthinkable
and despicable of ways. Our scholars and heroes are slandered, jailed and murdered
ruthlessly, and so much more. And Allah alone knows the true extent, and to Him
alone do we complain and seek assistance.”239
In contrast to IS, and in alignment with the messaging of AQ, JN presents itself as a
viable vanguard of the Muslim community. In doing so, its ingroup and outgroup boundaries are
not established in reference to a fixed structure of authority, like an Islamic state. Indeed, JN’s
boundaries of inclusion are certainly more permeable, because the organization has measured its
viability on the status of popular support amongst local Sunnis who oppose the Assad regime.
JN’s immediate goal is to integrate amongst the population, rather than to sort out the obedient
from the disobedient. This approach is best described by a Chechen fighter stationed in northern
Syria who was interviewed by Al-Risalah:
“The mujahid is like a fish and the people are like the sea, and the wider the sea,
the easier it is for the mujahid to swim. As more people love the mujahideen, there
are more opportunities for the mujahideen. But as soon as the mujahideen feel that
they have power, they begin to act as though they are the true masters of the world
and that all others are their slaves. They show great disrespect and harshness
towards the weak Muslims, something our Prophet didn’t even do to the mushkreen
of his time.”240
In this interview, the fighter describes the Maoist-style insurgent approach of gaining
popular support that is upheld by most insurgent non-state groups. In order to maximize a local
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coalition of “hearts and minds,” JN constrained its use of mass-casualty attacks against civilians,
and in fact presented itself as a protector of Syrians. As one ad in Al-Risalah states, “The Khalifa
Should be the Shield of the Ummah not the Sword Against it.”241 Therefore, JN presents itself as
a foil to IS, and suggests that its brand of Islamic rule would be in the true interest of the Muslim
community. Table 2 reflects how JN relies mostly on articles, statements, and advertisements in
Al-Risalah to portray itself as a value-oriented ingroup that looks externally, to unify more
Muslims under an eventual Islamic political order.
Takfir
The sample publications of IS’s Rumiyah and Dabiq present a dichotomized worldview
to readership of a righteous insular caliphate, and an external world teeming with a diverse field
of infidels that must be eliminated for IS to realize its ultimate social order. IS utilizes symbolic
language to infer that violence is the ultimate way to address grievances. One excerpt from
Rumiyah states, “After the trials and tribulations, only the pure will remain. These are those
whose cores have been cleansed and clarified of any impurities and filth of the dunya” (the
temporal world).242
Another symbol of ethnic cleansing that IS operationalizes is fire. Multiple articles
written by IS propagandists focus on IS’s rationale for killing captives with fire, after radical
Islamist groups condemned IS’s burning alive of a Jordanian pilot in January of 2015.243 One
article from Rumiyah that is titled “The Flames of Justice,” IS uses another scriptural example of
Muhammad’s comrade Saddiq, who “burned those who resisted the zakat (Islamic State
taxes)…(and) killed murtadd captives- whose apostasy was of a severe nature- in the worst of
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ways in order to terrorize and disperse the remaining murtaddin.”244 The conclusion of the article
is accompanied by an image of a burned corpse of an anonymous captive, and quotes Allah,
stating, “Indeed, those who disbelieve in Our verses- We will drive them into a fire. Every time
their skins are roasted through, we will replace them with other skins so that they may taste the
punishment.”245 Therefore, IS uses propaganda to legitimate ethnic cleansing as a righteous
means of establishing a true Islamic State.
The frequent declaration of takfir, which implies labelling people as kufr apostates
worthy of execution, is a rhetorical tool that IS uses to cultivate a polarized worldview for its
membership. An article in Dabiq poses a rebuttal to AQ’s “Guidelines for Jihadi Action” that
were stipulated by Zawahiri, which states that “deviant sects, (such as the Druze, Sufis, and Shia)
should not be fought,” as long as these groups do not fight Sunni jihadist organizations.246 IS
brought this policy into debate when JN’s leader Jolani appeared on the Arab news network AlJazeera in 2015 to state that his group would not harm Druze civilians under the regions of his
control.247 IS seized this announcement as a clear example that JN was willing to blur the lines of
who constituted the enemy in Salafi-jihadist practice.
The teachings of the 14th century Islamic Scholar Ibn Taymiyyah were selected by IS to
describe Sunni Muslims that refuse to use force against Druze civilians. The quote states, “The
kufr of these people (the Druze) is a matter over which the Muslims do not differ. Rather
whoever doubts their kufr is a kāfir like them.”248 In other words, the pages of Dabiq render JN’s
inclination to constrain violence against civilians as a move so traitorous to the Salafi-jihadist
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camp, that JN is also a collective of apostates worthy of death. This animosity is communicated
in the term that IS media uses to describe the coalition of Sunni Syrian groups that refuse to
pledge allegiance to the caliphate. IS refers to these organizations, including JN, as the “Sahwat,”
which is the Arab word for “collaborators” that are “the worst of the worst.”249 As evidenced in
Table 2, a quarter of the articles from IS’s publication sample detail the deviousness of other
jihadis operating in Syria, that IS blames as the perpetrators of discord in the Salafi jihadist
camp.
While IS makes the rhetorical argument that a unified Islamic community is achieved by
expunging Muslim and non-Muslim “near enemy” actors from the Middle East, JN stages itself
as a desirable foil to this extremism. In response to IS practices of excommunication, JN mirrors
the traditional Salafi-jihadist ideology by interviewing an AQ operative working on behalf of JN
in Syria. He states:

“Al Qaeda is an organization along with the Taliban...all of us as Mujhahideen,
distance ourselves greatly from the takfir (extremism) methodology and ideology.
We see the Ummah as one, and in a very precarious state. So we are trying to bring
to the Muslim Ummah into a new age of Islamic honor, and not differentiate and
feel that those that don’t come up with the ‘standard’ of certain people are kuffar
and/or apostates. We look at everything Islamically and try to act accordingly.”250
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Therefore, JN stages itself as a
unifying actor that does not claim the
authority to delineate strict ingroup
outgroup identities to achieve their
objective. In fact, JN uses the
historically significant “Kharwaij”
term used by traditional Salafi-jihadist
groups to describe contemporary
Image 1 From Al-Risalah Issue 3 pg 1213.
ultraviolent groups that mirror the behavior of the extremist sect during Muhammad’s rule. One
advertisement in Al-Risalah features an armed operative artistically splashed with bright paint,
across which block lettering declares, “Jihad is Beautiful. It liberates the oppressed and helps the
needy. Don’t let its beauty be spoilt by the extremism of the Khwarij.”251 JN continually presents
the Perception of Crisis narrative within the Salafi- jihadist camp as one that is defined by IS’s
excessive use of violence. In one article titled, “This Is Al Qaeda, or Have They Forgotten?” JN
emphasizes the ways IS has drifted from the pragmatic path for jihad set by Zawahiri. In
reference to AQ, the article states,
Their methodology was not that of making takfir upon those who differ with
them, with doubtful evidences, and after that sending cars filled with explosives
and armed men who plunge in their houses! And their methodology was not that
of killing women and children of the disbelievers on purpose!252
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In the same manner that IS presents an argument to its readership that there is a crisis
amongst Salafi-jihadists due to a resistance against perpetrating violence against non-combatants
in Syria, JN relies on the argument that IS exhibits an unrestrained brutality that threatens the
public. Furthermore, JN also presents itself as a
practical and careful organization in contrast to the
relentless warfare tactics used by the Assad regime.
An article regarding claims of IS’s use of chemical
weapons against civilians in Al-Risalah captures
JN’s effort to frame both IS and Assad as equally
threatening actors towards Syrians. Underscored
with images of incapacitated civilian victims, the
segment claims that IS abandoned “defending
Muslims from Bashar’s soldiers… and instead
directed their arrows toward innocent Muslims.”253
By implying that IS has no qualms using chemical weapons

Image 2 from: Dabiq Issue 10,
pg 65.

that are characteristic of the Assad regime, JN suggests that IS and the Syrian government are
both complicit in targeting civilians.

Operations
IS and JN’s divergent stances on the caliphate and takfir culminate in their different
organizational plans of military action and governance. One of the most glaring differences
between the thematic content of IS and JN publications is their frequency of articles, statements,
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and advertisements relating to their organizational operations. The sample of IS magazines
dedicate 22% of its articles and 51% of its statements and advertisements to operational content.
In contrast, only 13% of articles and 18% of the statements and advertisements in Al-Risalah
focus on JN’s operational capacity.
This discrepancy signals the investment that IS has in crafting its identity as a jihadist
organization that designs and employs the highest caliber terror tactics. IS proves this groupupheld value to its readership by providing detailed instructional articles on the ideal methods for
attacking civilians abroad. Both issues of Rumiyah feature a column titled “Just Terror Tactics,”
which describe how Molotov cocktails and small knives can “bring untold misery to the enemies
of Allah.”254 While IS suggests its expertise in violent tactics to attract audiences, it grounds this
image with repeated advertisements for its “Ten Videos Selected From the Wilayat (provinces)
of The Islamic State.” The page-long ads feature ten screenshots accompanied with titles that
communicate the purpose of each operational video produced by IS’s Al Hayat media platform.
A majority of the images in the sample advertisements signal that the video is related to
battlefield operations. Integrated amongst promotions for warfare footage are several photos that
feature unidentified captives in prison jumpsuits either held at gunpoint or at the blade of a knife
to signify their upcoming capital punishment. These images communicate IS’s strict dedication
to implementing sharia law against enemies and subjects who violate their principles of ingroup
supremacy. In these highly communicative excerpts, IS normalizes violence for their ingroup via
their instructional articles and through their deeds in the caliphate.
IS’s offensive military strategies explicitly sanction violence against individuals in their
custody, but against collectives they intend to conquer. An article in Rumiyah titled “Collateral
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Damage” makes the case for how IS operatives can choose the timing of their attacks to justify
their killing of non-combatant kufr women and children.
“As for kafir women and children who do not fight or otherwise partake in
hostilities, then the principle stands that they should not be deliberately killed,
meaning that one should not single them out for targeting. However, when they are
not distinctly isolated from the kafir men or when they are not easily distinguishable
from them, then their collateral killing is a justified part of the jihad against the
kuffar… the best practice when conducting raids is to start during the night or at
the break of dawn, before the sun rises, while the enemy is asleep. At such a time,
it is very likely to enter buildings where no light shines and an adult male is not
easily distinguishable from women and children. Indeed, it is from the Sunnah of
Allah to attack His enemies while they are asleep, whether at night or during the
day… ‘The Prophet …was asked about the people of an area who were raided at
night, with their women and children being killed and wounded. He said, ‘They are
from them.’”255
As demonstrated in this paragraph, IS presents the best methods for its operatives to
religiously rationalize violence against women and children, under the conditions of their
indistinguishability during a nighttime attack. This captures the group’s stance that operatives
should deliberately plan their attacks to maximize violence against civilians that they view as
apostates. IS’s ingroup policy of ethnic cleansing based on a premise of religious authority is
highly apparent in this segment.
JN’s operational segments predominantly feature their military engagement on the front
lines of the Syrian conflict. For example, one article in Al-Risalah describes JN’s battle with IS
for the city of Aleppo.256 Another operational segment details the Jaish al-Fath coalition’s victory
over Assad regime forces in the Idlib town of Jisr al-Shughour during the spring of 2015.257 This
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event marked the “near-total strategic defeat upon the regime” in the Idlib governate and
demonstrated the “value of close multi-group cooperation in the battle against the regime.”258
The 2015 to 2016 publication period of the magazines produced by JN align with the
timeline of the group’s shared governance alongside other Sunni opposition forces of Idlib. In
the second installment of Al-Risalah, JN demonstrates their organization’s “moderate”
implementation of sharia in contrast to IS, by detailing the whipping of two criminals, and the
execution of a regime soldier who had been captured while fleeing the battle of Jisr al-Shughour.
The article is prefaced by stating that the penalized individuals in question “were neither abused
or sworn at, in fact, they were treated with mercy.”259 The article highlights steps of religious due
process, as a head judge oversaw the punishment and allowed the prisoners to pray before their
sentence, steps that the segment claims IS would condemn.
JN’s single article from the sample magazines that references sharia is a testament to the
balance that the organization attempts to strike in appealing to its readership. While JN intends to
cast itself as a true Salafi jihadist group that will implement sharia when it has established
political viability in a region, it also relies on a power-sharing dynamic with more moderate
Islamic groups that have enabled JN to succeed. JN’s ideological motive to conduct jihadism
through integration rather than aggression has resulted in the group’s continuous attempts to
avoid a local reputation as an excessively violent or power-hungry organization. While this
public image does not entirely curb JN’s violence against civilians, it directly factors into the
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group’s calculated strategy to monitor its violent conduct. In contrast to IS, excessive force used
by JN can be more organizationally detrimental than instrumental.
Al-Risalah, Dabiq, and Rumiyah are vessels for the collective worldviews that IS and JN
aim to propagate. The pages of these magazines feature a diverse range of content from
theological arguments, to news reels, to meticulously designed propaganda that add varying
dimensions to the respective worldviews that each group values to function. In sum, these
segments are integrated to form a coherent “motive and framework for action” for the respective
readership of each publication.
A dichotomized ideological lens is reinforced across all items from Dabiq and Rumiyah.
Ingroups and outgroups are strictly delineated in reference to an individual’s eligibility to live in
the territorialized caliphate that the group prioritized as their objective. While swaths of nonSunni groups are wholly deemed as impure due to their religion, a further cohort of Sunni
Muslims are excommunicated due to their lack of explicit support for the autonomous rule of IS.
IS deliberately makes a case for its religious authority to use force by selecting ultraviolent
segments of Islamic scripture that illustrate methods of force used by the first generations of
Islamic governance. By cultivating a righteous self-image in association with religious tradition,
IS operationalizes language of purification to socially sanction members violent “cleansing”
amongst its membership. IS finally endorses violent means to a glorified end by example,
through a plethora of media content that depicts violence against unidentifiable groups of
prisoners.
JN’s convictions that integration is the immediate objective of jihad are imbued in the
narrative of Al-Risalah. Its pages communicate the prioritization of unity over division by
highlighting the value of cooperative practices for the readership. The organization’s
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reinforcement of coalition-building is paired with a message that the group’s essential imperative
is to protect the common Sunni Muslim in Syria, and to incentivize rather than impel popular
support. JN invokes religious references to stage current circumstances of the Muslim
communities in the Middle East as dire, and leverages its role as a “protector” in contrast to the
brutal campaigns of the Assad regime and IS. JN has crafted a public image based on qualities of
pragmatism, trustworthiness, and controlled violence. Therefore, as evident in the operational
section, the group has an objective to illustrate its implementation of sharia law as merciful,
controlled, and directed against a specified group of wrong-doers.

88

4
CONCLUSION
This thesis explicates how the nuances in Salafi jihadist ideology result in organizational
discrepancies regarding civilian targeting in the Syrian civil war. While multiple studies have
comparatively analyzed the contents of IS’s Dabiq and AQ’s Inspire publications, no studies
have explicitly contrasted the propaganda of the two prominent and antagonistic jihadist groups
in Syria: IS and JN.260 By examining publications from JN’s Al-Risalah and IS’s Dabiq and
Rumiyah with a specific focus on group values and polarizing messaging that mobilizes
operatives from each organization, this research poses that ideology is not a superficial façade
created on a whim by group leaders. Rather, ideology is an autonomous apparatus that operates
beyond the agency of one key leader. It is resolved that collectively espoused beliefs attract
fighters with immaterial incentives, institute rituals that form intra-group bonds, and determine
whether violence against non-combatants promotes or impedes trajectories of group legitimacy
in a conflict.
By analyzing the publications of IS and JN, this thesis determines that two Salafi jihadist
groups embedded in the same conflict are capable of adopting entirely divergent ideological
models. The dispute between jihadists who seek to immediately establish caliphate and those
who prioritize defeating the Assad regime critically shapes the experience of Syrians today. This
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distinction determines whether a group like IS views civilians as subjects that must obey group
authority at the penalty of death, or, in JN’s view, “hearts and minds” that can be gradually
persuaded to provide support. With this information, counterterrorism experts can predict the
current threats that each group poses to non-combatants in Syria and construct effective
counternarratives that employ persuasive tactics used to radicalize members.
By 2018, IS lost the majority of its territory to the multitude of actors that it opposed in
Syria. JN has retained territory in Idlib under the coalition name Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and has
claimed to cut ties with AQ, although most terrorism experts suspect this divorce is a strategic
move to disincentivize Western counterterrorism airstrikes against the militia. With or without a
current territorial presence, the ideologies of each group have circulated through Syria, and have
captured the attention of jihadist sympathizers across the globe. The psychological influence of
each group in Syria cannot be ignored or instantaneously eliminated by counterterrorism experts.
However, the radicalization activities of these organizations can be effectively combated through
international action and counter messaging strategies.
JN has put nine years into building relationships with militias and citizens on the ground
in Syria. As long as the international community continues to falter on a resolution to end the
Assad regime’s relentless attacks against civilians, radical Islamist groups such as JN will
continue to exploit a logic of advantageous comparison to frame their organization as a viable
political movement. After years of Syrian Army airstrikes and chemical attacks on the population
have precipitated few united measures from global powerbrokers to end the conflict, many
civilians may come to view groups like JN as the only revolutionary militia in Syria that can
institute law and order.261 The West should do more than order airstrikes to undermine the
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operational capability of JN or rely on ceasefires to mitigate their military engagement with
Assad. The past several years has proven that the group can survive counterterrorism operations
and maintain strongholds in pockets of northwestern Syria. Instead, Western political leaders
must commit to investing in moderate competitors that can attract revolutionary fighters who do
not subscribe to a radical Islamist agenda, yet currently support JN due to the group’s dedication
of firepower to the Syrian opposition. By fostering a secular nationalist organization with
military and humanitarian resources, international actors can erode the leverage that JN uses to
frame the group as a temperate actor in relation to Assad. 262
While IS has lost the physical manifestation of a utopian caliphate, its resurgence is
possible with the intensification of sectarian divisions in the Middle East, especially between
Sunni and Shia Muslims. As long as the group can proliferate a convincing image of an
Islamically “pure” organization that is capable of restoring a sense of belonging for politically
disenfranchised Sunni Muslims in the Middle East, the group can sustain a radicalized following.
Effective counter messaging strategies would highlight the rhetorical disparities between IS’s
promised paradise-like state, and the ultimately repressive regime that the group implemented in
the mid 2010’s.263 This strategy would dispel the IS covenant that a dichotomized world of good
and evil will result in state of Islamic prosperity.
A valuable extension of this research would reach beyond the borders of Syria, to explore
the ideologies of AQ-inspired Salafi jihadist groups that operate across the globe. One such
organization is Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an organization that, much like JN, is affiliated
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with AQ, focuses on attacking the Pakistani government, and is comprised of local militias.264
By approaching this TTP’s propaganda through an ideological lens of ingroup, outgroup,
prioritized objective, and goal distinctions, terrorism scholars can continue to elucidate how
groups in different security environments interpret the role of jihad. Results could be compared
to the ideological profiles of radical Islamist organizations that have emerged since the 1980’s to
create a comprehensive study on the evolution of Salafi jihadist thought and fracturing of the
camp over time.
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List of Arabic Terms
1. bay’at- an oath of allegiance.
2. dunya- the temporal world, the test leading to Paradise.
3. emir- leader of Islamic emirate.
4. jahiliyah- ignorant societies prior to first generations of Muslims.
5. Jannah- Muslim paradise, similar to concept of heaven.
6. Jawlānī front - JN (led by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani).
7. khilafiah- term for Islamic Caliphate.
8. Khawaarij- term for brutal Muslim sect that existed in Prophet Muhammad’s era.
9. kufr- community of unbelievers.
10. hadd (Hudud) - enforcement of Shariah law, including whipping, mutilation, execution
penalties.
11. mushrkin- polytheist.
12. murtadd- an apostate, one who has abandoned Islam.
13. Sawhat- IS term for Syrian opposition coalition that includes the JN, the Free Syrian
Army and Ahrar al-Sham, among smaller allied groups.
14. Shām- Syria.
15. Shuhada- martyrdom.
16. Taghut- tyrant or oppressor.
17. takfir- the labeling of fellow Muslims as unbelievers.
18. Ummah- Muslim community.
19. wilayat- regional province.
20. zakat- religious tax.
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